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Attraction vs coercion: why some nations lead through culture and others through force

November 13, 2026 · 9 min

Ryan Castillo & Jordan Hale

Okay, I need to just — before we get into anything, how much do you actually think about why countries dismantle things? Like not build, dismantle? That's an odd entry point. Where's this going? Russia, right after Crimea, 2014 — they shut down cultural and educational exchange programs. Years of soft power infrastructure, pulled apart…

Power in international relations describes a state's capacity to shape the behavior of other actors and the outcomes of global politics. Political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr.

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About this episode

Power in international relations describes a state's capacity to shape the behavior of other actors and the outcomes of global politics. Political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Grounded in 11 sources
What Is Soft Power? | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ↗ · belfercenter.org
Soft power and cultural relations: a comparative analysis | British Council ↗ · britishcouncil.org
CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION AMONG CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES ↗ · bulletin-socpolit.kaznpu.kz
Hybrid Conflict: The Roles of Russia, North Korea and China ↗ · clingendael.org
Soft power diplomacy - Diplo ↗ · diplomacy.edu
How China and Russia Wield Strategic Communications to ... ↗ · docs.aiddata.org
- A NEW APPROACH FOR AN ERA OF U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION ↗ · govinfo.gov
European Exposure to Chinese Power ↗ · gppi.net
In uence Operations of China, Russia, and the Soviet Union: A Comparison ↗ · nipp.org
Charm Offensive or Offensive Charm? An Analysis of Russian and Chinese Cultural Institutes Abroad ↗ · openresearch.ceu.edu
Soft Power with Sharp Edges: China’s Global Narrative War ↗ · orfonline.org
Read transcript

Jordan Hale: Okay, I need to just — before we get into anything, how much do you actually think about why countries dismantle things? Like not build, dismantle?

Ryan Castillo: That's an odd entry point. Where's this going?

Jordan Hale: Russia, right after Crimea, 2014 — they shut down cultural and educational exchange programs. Years of soft power infrastructure, pulled apart in weeks. And I keep thinking, that's not nothing. That's a deliberate act during a hard power confrontation. Why bother?

Ryan Castillo: Because it signals something. You don't dismantle what you think is worthless.

Jordan Hale: Exactly — and so now I'm thinking about Joseph Nye, who named all of this in the late 1980s, soft power as influence through attraction rather than coercion, and then China basically takes that concept and builds the most institutionalized version of it in history — Confucius Institutes starting 2004, embedded in universities worldwide — and the question underneath all of it is... is soft power actually an alternative to hard power, or is it always just operating in hard power's shadow?

Ryan Castillo: The structural point is that it's not a menu. Every dollar into cultural influence programs is a dollar not in military capacity — the trade-off is persistent, not episodic.

Jordan Hale: So it's less like a choice and more like... I don't know, a forced hand depending on where you sit in the global order.

Ryan Castillo: Which nations can afford not to choose hard power — that's the question that actually matters. And the answer isn't the same for everyone.

Jordan Hale: But that forced-hand framing — I mean, it kind of assumes soft power is the budget option. Like the thing you pick when you can't afford the other thing. And I'm not sure that holds up when you actually look at what China spent.

Ryan Castillo: It doesn't hold up. That's the whole problem with how Nye framed it — cheaper complement to military capacity. But China built a blue-water navy and ran the Confucius Institute program simultaneously. Those are not cheap-substitution moves.

Jordan Hale: Wait, so we've been calling it cheaper this whole time and it's just... not?

Ryan Castillo: It's not cheaper, it's slower. Think of it like planting a tree versus buying lumber. You're not spending less. You're spending differently, across a longer stretch of time, across multiple administrations who didn't make the original bet.

Jordan Hale: Oh — okay, that actually reframes everything. Because the cost is real, it's just distributed across budgets that no single leader owns. So it looks invisible on any one administration's ledger.

Ryan Castillo: Exactly — and Russia's influence operations, same deal. Large-scale, expensive, designed to run over years. What we're actually comparing when we call soft power cheaper is two completely different accounting systems. Defense budgets are line items. Cultural programs get buried in education spending, state media funding — it never shows up next to the aircraft carrier.

Jordan Hale: And Sweden closing four of the five Confucius Institutes — you know, that happened because the cost finally became visible. Not in dollars but in, like, academic freedom complaints, espionage accusations. The cost surfaced in a completely different currency than it was originally spent in.

Ryan Castillo: Which is the real trap. You invest across fifteen years, it registers on nobody's balance sheet — and then the backlash lands all at once, politically, in somebody else's term. The temporal gap isn't a feature of soft power. It's the structural vulnerability.

Jordan Hale: And that backlash surfacing in a different currency — that's exactly what I want to pull on, because like, imagine a graduate student in Stockholm, 2019, she's enrolled in a Mandarin course at her university, it's funded through a Confucius Institute. From where she's sitting, that is just... cultural exchange. Language class. Right?

Ryan Castillo: And then the institute closes.

Jordan Hale: And then it closes — Sweden shut four out of five Confucius Institutes. Same institution, same curriculum, same funding structure she walked into. Her government looked at that exact thing and saw a security threat.

Ryan Castillo: Which means the soft-or-hard question isn't a property of the tool. It's a property of which side of the relationship you're standing on.

Jordan Hale: There's actually a name for that. Sharp power — it's this, I mean, it's the concept that describes influence that looks like cultural exchange but functions as coercion. Academic interference, curriculum pressure, espionage accusations. The Confucius Institutes got accused of all of it, and once that frame sticks, the soft power project is already over.

Ryan Castillo: When soft power requires enforcement to function, it's already failed as soft power. That's not a paradox — it's a definition.

Jordan Hale: Which is why the Goethe Institut is the contrast that actually matters. Germany's version — it's structurally independent from direct government control, and that independence is precisely what keeps it credible. Nobody's shutting down German language courses because there's no coercion mechanism attached to them.

Ryan Castillo: So the Confucius model failed not because of the content — Mandarin instruction, cultural programming — but because the funding architecture made coercion possible. The tool was fine. The control structure poisoned it.

Jordan Hale: And honestly, that's going to get darker when we get to who actually *decides* these budgets — because the accountability problem for soft power might be even more broken than the coercion problem.

Ryan Castillo: And that accountability problem runs deeper than broken budgets — it's actually a structural feature of democratic electoral cycles. The Confucius Institutes launched in 2004. We're in 2024. Twenty years later, we genuinely cannot say whether they moved the needle on Chinese cultural appeal. That's not a measurement problem we haven't solved yet. That's a measurement failure. No democratic leader can walk into a budget hearing and say 'fund this for two decades and we'll check back.'

Jordan Hale: Wait — twenty years and we still can't attribute ROI to them?

Ryan Castillo: Cleanly? No. And the Belfer Center's framing on the U.S.-China competition calls soft power credibility a long-run strategic asset — which is analytically correct. But 'long-run' in democratic politics is, like, the next midterm.

Jordan Hale: So the argument is structurally undefendable even if it's right. Which is — I mean, that's a really dark place to land, because it means the incentive is always going to tilt toward the thing that delivers a visible win inside a term.

Ryan Castillo: Hard power does that. Sanctions compliance — you know within months. Battlefield outcomes — real time. Soft power effects show up in public opinion shifts, diplomatic realignment, cultural adoption patterns. Years out. Sometimes a decade.

Jordan Hale: What actually breaks me a little — Hollywood. Elite American universities. The dollar. Those are the United States' most durable soft power assets, and none of them came from a budget line. No administration planned them.

Ryan Castillo: That's the number that reframes everything. What we call projection might just be a byproduct of domestic vitality. Not a policy output. A side effect.

Jordan Hale: Which means — wait, actually — if the most effective soft power is emergent rather than programmed, then Central Asian states aren't passive recipients absorbing whatever China or the U.S. broadcasts. They're selecting. They're active participants in this competition, choosing what sticks.

Ryan Castillo: And you can't project something that requires the target's consent. Which is where Nye's whole framework gets genuinely uncomfortable — if soft power only works when the recipient accepts it, is it power at all, or is it just persuasion waiting to be refused?

Jordan Hale: And that's the thing I can't settle. Because if the British Council only works — like, it only functions as soft power — because audiences in Cairo or Nairobi perceive it as independent of Whitehall, then Britain isn't projecting anything. It's just... leaving something out and hoping people pick it up voluntarily. That's not projection. That's an offering.

Ryan Castillo: Which means the sender can't control the outcome. And if you can't control the outcome, the word 'power' is doing a lot of work it probably shouldn't be doing.

Jordan Hale: And Britain's pivot to the British Council — I mean, that wasn't purely strategic calculation. It was post-imperial. It was needing to tell a story about who you still are when the empire is gone. So nations aren't even choosing rationally between tools. They're expressing something about themselves. Their anxieties. And the power projection, if it happens at all, is kind of... downstream of that.

Ryan Castillo: So the framework Nye built — the whole soft versus hard architecture — it may just be describing a constraint masquerading as a choice. I keep landing there and I'm not sure I can argue my way out of it.

Jordan Hale: No. Me neither. That's genuinely where I'm stuck. Good place to stop, though — I think that's the most honest we can be about it.