Onpode
Cover art for Building parallel supply chains and markets to escape dependency on a single power

Building parallel supply chains and markets to escape dependency on a single power

November 15, 2026 · 10 min

June Hadley & Cleo Rios

Before we start — did you end up reading that thing I sent on economic statecraft? Because I want to know if it changed anything for you. I did, and honestly it made me more unsettled, not less. Because there's this assumption baked into the whole framework — that chokepoints hold. That if you control…

Nations across the Global South and Eurasia are increasingly forming or deepening alternative trade blocs — most prominently BRICS (and its expanded BRICS+ formation), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and a web of regional free trade agreements — with a shared structural goal: reducing asymmetric dependency on the U.S.-centered financial and trade order.

0:009:59
Get the next episode on World →

Follow it free — new episodes land in your feed.

Or make your own — any topic, in minutes

More Onpode episodes on World →

About this episode

Nations across the Global South and Eurasia are increasingly forming or deepening alternative trade blocs — most prominently BRICS (and its expanded BRICS+ formation), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and a web of regional free trade agreements — with a shared structural goal: reducing asymmetric dependency on the U.S.-centered financial and trade order.

Grounded in 11 sources
Trump's Tariff Offensive and the Rise of Strategic Regionalism: Toward Decentralized Globalization | Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences | Springer Nature Link ↗ · link.springer.com
Geoeconomics and trade - European Central Bank ↗ · ecb.europa.eu
Dedollarization: Causes, Constraints, and Consequences | AIER ↗ · aier.org
Great fracture as 3 rival blueprints for the global economy emerge ↗ · asiatimes.com
BRICS Pay — pay freely. Pay anywhere. | BRICS+ Payment Ecosystem ↗ · brics-pay.com
BRICS Pay glossary: DCMS, CBDC, SDR and other terms — BRICS Pay ↗ · bricspayment.ru
China’s Dedollarisation Strategy – European Macro Policy Network ↗ · empn.eu
Economic warfare: The weapon of sanctions against Iran, Russia, and Huawei ↗ · en.unav.edu
mBridge: Is China Building a New Global Payments Rail? ↗ · equityreads.com
From Chokepoints to Choices: Europe and IMEC | German Marshall Fund of the United States ↗ · gmfus.org
Formation of Regional Trade Blocs: A Theoretical Perspective Using Game Theory, The ↗ · iatp.org
Read transcript

June Hadley: Before we start — did you end up reading that thing I sent on economic statecraft? Because I want to know if it changed anything for you.

Cleo Rios: I did, and honestly it made me more unsettled, not less. Because there's this assumption baked into the whole framework — that chokepoints hold. That if you control SWIFT access, you control the outcome.

June Hadley: And SWIFT disconnection was supposed to be the proof case.

Cleo Rios: Russia, 2022, the invasion — they get cut from SWIFT, everyone calls it the financial nuclear option, and then... Russia keeps selling oil. Keeps moving semiconductors. Routes through Iran, China, Central Asia. The nuclear option did not produce a crater.

June Hadley: Now, I want to be careful — sanctions did hurt. That's well-documented. The question is whether hurt is the same as isolation, and I think those are genuinely different things.

Cleo Rios: That is exactly the distinction that breaks the whole narrative open. And here's the structural piece that gets me — SWIFT is Belgian infrastructure. The access lever sits with the EU, not even the U.S. So when people talk about dollar-system chokepoints, they're already pointing at the wrong map.

June Hadley: So if redundancy — multiple routes, multiple rails — makes any single embargo less decisive, the real question for today is: what does leverage actually mean in a world where the system doesn't work by default anymore?

Cleo Rios: When you can route around it, is it still a chokepoint. That's the thing.

June Hadley: When it stops being a chokepoint — that's the whole mechanism, actually. Think of it like a town with one road in and one road out. If you control that road, you control the town. Full stop. But build a second road and your leverage collapses almost immediately. That's the core idea. Supply-chain redundancy as sanctions insulation — you're not eliminating the threat, you're just making it much more expensive to execute.

Cleo Rios: And that's literally what BRICS and the SCO are building. A second road.

June Hadley: Right — but the part that doesn't fit so cleanly is the U.S. still has secondary sanctions. Sanctions that reach China and India separately. So it's not a clean West-versus-rest map where you build the second road and you're free. The second road has its own tolls.

Cleo Rios: Wait, so the alternative route is also partially controlled by the same power you're routing around?

June Hadley: Partially. I mean — that's what asymmetric vulnerability actually means in practice. A country dependent on dollar-denominated capital can't just flip to the New Development Bank overnight and call it done, because the NDB members themselves are still commercially connected to dollar markets. The redundancy is real but it's partial.

Cleo Rios: So the second road exists but it doesn't go all the way to town yet. And you still need the first road for certain trips.

June Hadley: That's exactly the texture of it. And — okay, this is the thing that shifts how I think about economic statecraft as a tool — if the alternative road even exists, the credibility of blocking the first one drops. You don't have to actually use the second road for it to change the negotiation.

Cleo Rios: The threat of rerouting is doing political work even when no one's actually rerouting. That's a different kind of leverage than I expected this to be.

June Hadley: And that's exactly where I want to go deeper — because the second road being built right now isn't just rhetorical. BRICS actually constructed institutions. The New Development Bank, 2014, operational 2015, equal shareholding among members — that's a deliberate architectural choice. Not weighted voting like the IMF.

Cleo Rios: Equal shareholding is wild when you say it out loud. The World Bank has been running weighted-vote governance for seventy years and nobody blinked, and then one institution shows up structured differently and suddenly the whole assumption is visible.

June Hadley: Right — but then there's mBridge. And this is the one that actually caught me off guard.

Cleo Rios: mBridge — the central banks of China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the UAE are running multilateral CBDC settlement. Right now. Not a 2030 roadmap, not a framework agreement. Live. Under BIS auspices. That's the part that broke my brain a little.

June Hadley: It's operating.

Cleo Rios: It's operating. Cross-border digital currency settlement without dollar intermediation, actually being tested in real transactions. And then — India's BRICS presidency turned around and categorically rejected a common currency. The October 2026 New Delhi Declaration is calling for more local-currency settlement on one hand, and India is saying absolutely not to any shared monetary architecture on the other.

June Hadley: Those two things are in the same document, more or less.

Cleo Rios: Practically in the same breath. And I mean — maybe that tells you everything about the fracture underneath? Because if you then factor in that China is roughly 70% of BRICS+ GDP, the multilateral autonomy framing starts to feel, I don't know, optimistic. You might be trading dollar dependency for yuan dependency and calling it liberation.

June Hadley: That's the question on my mind. The NDB's equal shareholding is a structural counter to exactly that dynamic — it's the one place where the architecture actually says China doesn't get more votes because it's bigger. But whether that holds when China is 70% of your economic weight, I genuinely don't know. The sourcing doesn't settle it.

Cleo Rios: And honestly that gap — between what these institutions say they're doing and what they can actually deliver — that's the part we haven't even touched yet. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS Pay, the DCMS linking UPI and Pix and CIPS and SPFS — there's a human texture to navigating all of that simultaneously that I think breaks open the whole aspiration-versus-implementation question, and we're going to get there.

June Hadley: And that aspiration-versus-implementation gap — I think the SCO is actually the clearest test case, because it's older. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been signing economic cooperation agreements for years, and what it has mostly produced is... framework agreements. Signed, announced, not implemented. The interoperability, the regulatory coordination — that's still not there.

Cleo Rios: So the second road has a groundbreaking ceremony every year and no asphalt.

June Hadley: Basically. And BRICS Pay — the DCMS that's supposed to link UPI, Pix, CIPS, SPFS — same pattern. It exists on paper more than in practice. Member economies are still deeply integrated into dollar markets. The aspiration significantly outpaces the delivery.

Cleo Rios: Okay but — picture a corporate treasurer in 2025. She needs to move payment for a semiconductor shipment. She's maintaining live relationships across CIPS, UPI, and a dollar-clearing correspondent simultaneously. And she's timing which invoice goes through which channel based on what the geopolitical temperature is that week.

June Hadley: That's not autonomy.

Cleo Rios: It's permanent cognitive load as a business model. That's what partial resilience actually feels like from the inside — not freedom, just more complexity to manage.

June Hadley: And I think — mm — that's the most honest way to name what these blocs are actually delivering. Reduced exposure, not eliminated. The 2026 New Delhi Declaration said so implicitly: deep concern about unilateral tariff actions inconsistent with WTO rules, push for local-currency settlement — but those are responses to pressure, not declarations of independence.

Cleo Rios: And the pressure came from U.S. tariff policy. First term, 2017 to 2021, then the second term starting 2025 — applied to rivals and allies alike. The ECB literally frames that as the driver of geoeconomic fragmentation. The hegemon's own policy built the coalition against it.

June Hadley: The irony being — decentralized globalization, strategic regionalism, whatever you want to call it — it accelerated because Washington kept pulling the same lever on its own partners.

Cleo Rios: Partial resilience. That's the actual condition. Not insulation. Just enough of a second road that the threat of blocking the first one costs more than it used to.

June Hadley: And that's the thing I keep sitting with — the chokepoint framing we started with. You said it at the top: if you control SWIFT, you control the outcome. And now I'm not sure that was ever fully true, or whether it only felt true because no one had bothered to build the second road yet. The U.S. system worked by default. And now it has to be actively defended. That's already a structurally different world, even if BRICS Pay hasn't shipped and mBridge is still in trial phase.

Cleo Rios: The thought I haven't resolved — and I genuinely don't have an answer — is whether sitting in both systems at once is sovereignty or just a more elaborate captivity. Like, if a medium power can run dollars through one channel and local currency through another, depending on the week... is that distributed power, or is it being a permanent hostage to whichever relationship is more volatile right now. I actually don't know which one it is.

June Hadley: I don't think anyone does, honestly. And I find that more interesting than unsettling — which might be a very professor thing to say.