Ben Okonkwo: Long week — yours too by the look of it. I did want to ask, before we get into this: did you end up reading that Springer piece?
Jonathan Ingles: I did, and it crystallized something that's been irritating me for years. So let me try it on you. You're a historian of World War One — you study the causes. You find that if Austro-Hungary hadn't issued the ultimatum to Serbia, no war. You also find that if the German blank check had been withheld, no war. That the mobilization timetables had locked in a cascade that couldn't be reversed. That Franz Ferdinand's assassination was the proximate trigger. Dozens of conditions, each one capable of preventing the war on its own. What do you conclude?
Ben Okonkwo: Interesting — the natural conclusion seems like it should be: this was contingent, lots of different things could have broken differently. But I already see the trap.
Jonathan Ingles: The trap is overdetermination. If every one of those causes is independently sufficient to have produced the war, removing any single one still leaves you with all the others. The war happens anyway. And that means the war was, in that structural sense, inevitable — even though every individual cause looks like a hinge point.
Ben Okonkwo: Wait — so overdetermination and contingency are both simultaneously true? That's... hm. That feels like it shouldn't be possible.
Jonathan Ingles: It shouldn't. And yet historians of WWI resist saying the war was inevitable, full stop. They keep the contingency framing alive while also cataloguing every redundant sufficient cause. That's not a nuanced position. That's a contradiction they're living inside.
Ben Okonkwo: Now, the charitable read is that historical determinism is partly an artifact of hindsight bias — because we know the outcome, the path to it looks like the only path. So historians are actively resisting the bias by insisting alternatives were real.
Jonathan Ingles: Frankly that's the move I want to press on. Because resisting hindsight bias is good methodology. But it doesn't actually dissolve the overdetermination problem — it just changes the psychological story about why we got the analysis wrong. The logical structure is still the same.
Ben Okonkwo: So the genuine question underneath all of this — if overdetermination holds, and standard causal attribution becomes meaningless, what exactly is a historian of WWI doing when they write an explanation? Because they're clearly doing *something*.
Jonathan Ingles: That's what I want to work through. And the answer is weirder than I think most people expect.
Ben Okonkwo: So what they're doing — the answer is they're running a thought experiment. And that is, literally, the method. Here's the cleanest way I can put it: you trip on a cracked pavement, break your wrist. Was the crack the cause? Or the fact that you were running late? Or that it was raining? The only way to isolate which factor actually did the causal work is to mentally remove each one and ask — does the fall still happen? That's counterfactual reasoning. That's it. No jargon.
Jonathan Ingles: So historians are essentially running thought experiments on the past.
Ben Okonkwo: Exactly that. And this is not a new instinct — in Leopold von Ranke's 19th-century tradition, the whole push toward rigorous causal history already implied these kinds of questions. You can't say what caused something without implicitly asking what would have been different without it. Geoffrey Hawthorn later tried to make that move formally scientific — give it actual criteria, actual structure.
Jonathan Ingles: Right, but — and this is where I want to push — E. H. Carr called the whole enterprise a parlor game. In What Is History?, 1961. That's not a fringe position. That's the canonical structuralist objection.
Ben Okonkwo: He did. And look, Carr wasn't wrong to be suspicious — he was just suspicious for the wrong reasons. His objection was essentially that counterfactuals are unverifiable, so they're not history. But causal claims in history are always, at some level, unverifiable against a control. The counterfactual is just making the implicit explicit.
Jonathan Ingles: Okay but here's where I don't buy that rescue. Carr's deeper point — whether he knew it or not — is that the method isn't neutral. Niall Ferguson publishes Virtual History in 1997, uses counterfactuals to rehabilitate the British Empire. Same tool. Opposite politics from what Carr was defending against.
Ben Okonkwo: Right — and that is the actual problem with the method, not whether it's scientifically legitimate. The pavement analogy holds up as a causal logic. What it doesn't tell you is which factors you choose to test. If I only ask 'what if the crack wasn't there' and never ask 'what if the pavement hadn't been in a neighborhood that hadn't been maintained for a decade,' I've already made a political choice before the analysis starts.
Jonathan Ingles: That's — yeah. That's the tell I've been circling.
Ben Okonkwo: So the causal inference move is real — counterfactual tests are genuinely the primary tool for distinguishing cause from correlation in historiography. That's not in dispute. The problem is the question-selection. Ferguson choosing to ask 'what if Britain hadn't had an empire' rather than 'what if colonized populations had governed themselves' — that's not a methodological decision. That's a prior commitment dressed as a methodology.
Jonathan Ingles: And nobody names that incentive structure. The method gets credit for the rigor while the question-selection smuggles in the conclusion.
Ben Okonkwo: Now — I want to flag what we actually know versus what we've guessed well here, because I think the claim 'the method is inherently political' goes one step too far. The method is a logic. The application requires choosing which variables to test. Those are different things. One of them is neutral. The other, hm, really isn't.
Jonathan Ingles: So the contestation isn't whether counterfactual reasoning does causal work — it does. It's whether you can ever trust that the historian chose the right counterfactual to test rather than the convenient one.
Ben Okonkwo: And that trust problem is exactly where Virtual History breaks open. Because Ferguson isn't just using the method — the 1997 book opens with a direct attack on Marxist historiographical determinism. That's the frame before a single counterfactual gets run. So the political prior isn't buried in question selection. It's on the first page.
Jonathan Ingles: That's not historiography. That's political rehabilitation dressed up as epistemic rigor.
Ben Okonkwo: Right — but does that mean the method is broken, or that it needed disciplining criteria he didn't apply?
Jonathan Ingles: Same method, opposite politics from Carr. That's not coincidence. That's evidence the method doesn't constrain the conclusion.
Ben Okonkwo: Okay, so — imagine a museum curator in 2024. She's writing the caption for a panel on colonial administration in India. She has two options: 'this was the inevitable product of structural economic forces,' or 'these were choices men made on specific mornings.' Now, those aren't just different phrasings. They're actually... they're different causal claims. And the one she picks determines what her visitor thinks agency looks like in history.
Jonathan Ingles: And Ferguson's counterfactual move gives her the second caption with academic cover.
Ben Okonkwo: Exactly. 'What if Britain had not had an empire' — that question presupposes the empire was a contingent outcome, not a structural one. That presupposition is load-bearing. It's doing the rehabilitative work before the analysis even starts.
Jonathan Ingles: Which is where Althusser becomes interesting rather than just annoying. Because aleatory materialism — his late framework — actually tries to answer this. He says structures are themselves contingent outcomes. They don't suppress contingency; they emerged from it and can't fully bury it.
Ben Okonkwo: That sounds like a clever escape hatch.
Jonathan Ingles: It is. It's smuggling determinism back in through the emergency exit. Because if contingency is *necessary* to structure — if overdetermined and underdetermined factors together produce every transformation — then nothing was actually avoidable. You've just made the inevitability more complicated. The curator still has no grounds for writing 'these were choices.'
Ben Okonkwo: Hm. I'd push on that slightly — Althusser's move is to say structural causality doesn't require outcomes to be necessary, only that they're produced by deep economic and institutional forces converging. That's not the same as inevitable. It's... actually, no, I see where you're going. If every transformation emerges from that complex interplay regardless, the individual choice drops out as explanatory.
Jonathan Ingles: And the critics are right that Althusser reabsorbs contingency back into necessity. He keeps Marxist determinism alive after contingency should have killed it.
Ben Okonkwo: So what we actually have is Ferguson and Althusser both claiming to take contingency seriously, reaching opposite political conclusions, using frameworks that are each internally coherent. And hindsight bias is doing a lot of work in both — because once the British Empire *exists*, the structural story looks obvious, the contingent story looks revisionist. And we can't easily pull those apart from the archive alone. Which, frankly, is what makes the next problem worse — whether the fork moments historians identify were even real causal forks, or just perceived ones. That's where complexity theory starts to bite.
Jonathan Ingles: The method has a buried assumption nobody's naming yet.
Ben Okonkwo: And that buried assumption is actually the methodological trap — the Springer 2026 framework, the 'narratives of contingency' piece, it tries to solve this by going back to sources and reconstructing what actors genuinely perceived as open at the time. So not what we think was possible — what they thought was possible. The 1958-to-1960 molecular genetics decisions in Germany are the test case.
Jonathan Ingles: Specific institutional decisions in a lab program shaped the entire field's trajectory. I read that part.
Ben Okonkwo: Right — and from the archive, those decisions look genuinely contingent. The actors wrote memos debating alternatives, they expressed uncertainty, the path wasn't settled. So Springer says: perceived fork, real fork, the method works. But wait — that's the assumption doing all the load-bearing work. Did those scientists actually face real alternatives, or did it only look open because they lacked information the structural conditions had already foreclosed?
Jonathan Ingles: You can't tell from their papers.
Ben Okonkwo: You cannot. The memos show perceived contingency. They don't — and I want to be precise here — they don't confirm actual causal contingency. Those are different claims, and the framework slides between them.
Jonathan Ingles: So the method is reconstructing the actors' subjective experience of choice, not the actual structure of what was causally possible.
Ben Okonkwo: Which is where Benjamin Mueller's work at LSE becomes genuinely uncomfortable. He applies complexity theory to the end of the Cold War — and his finding is that deterministic IR analyses fail systematically because international systems are non-linear. Emergent. The outcome wasn't encoded in prior conditions in any stable way.
Jonathan Ingles: And if that's true for the Cold War ending — a system that massive — it probably holds for a 1958 German lab program.
Ben Okonkwo: Here's the uncomfortable part though. If Mueller's right that systems are non-linear and emergent, there may be no stable fork to locate anywhere. The fork isn't a real feature of the causal landscape — it's a device we impose retrospectively to make the past feel navigable.
Jonathan Ingles: The method produces comprehensibility. Not explanation.
Ben Okonkwo: And those are not the same thing. Comprehensibility is — actually, I want to sit with that distinction a second — it's not worthless, it's genuinely useful for actors making decisions now. But if you're claiming causal explanation, you need the fork to be real, not just felt.
Jonathan Ingles: Which means historical determinism — the thing counterfactual historians are arguing against — might just be an artifact of hindsight, like they claim. But the counterfactual fix doesn't escape that trap either. It just replaces one artifact with another.
Ben Okonkwo: Right — and that's genuinely unresolved. I don't think Springer solves it. Mueller's complexity framework actually makes it harder to solve, not easier.
Jonathan Ingles: So the honest version of the method admits it might be doing something closer to narrative therapy for the past than causal science. And nobody writing the textbooks wants to put it that way.
Ben Okonkwo: And that's — actually, that's what I think too. If you can't confirm the fork was real, and overdetermination makes individual causal attribution logically hollow, then the choice between those two framings isn't scholarly. It's political. Full stop. Whoever picks the frame is deciding who gets blamed.
Jonathan Ingles: And deciding what lessons policymakers draw from it. That's not a secondary consequence — that's the whole stakes.
Ben Okonkwo: Right — but I want to flag: treating every structural explanation as politically motivated is its own trap. That's an unfalsifiable cynicism. Sometimes overdetermination is just the accurate description of the causal landscape. You can't dismiss every 'it had to happen' claim as convenient.
Jonathan Ingles: No, that's fair. The discipline doesn't have a neutral position to retreat to — but that cuts both ways. It doesn't mean every causal claim is a cover story. It means the framing choice is never invisible, even when it's honest.
Ben Okonkwo: Pretending it's invisible just means someone else's politics are running it.
Jonathan Ingles: And that's true whether you're Carr calling it a parlor game in 1961 or Ferguson using it to rehabilitate an empire in 1997. Neither of them is standing outside the problem.
Ben Okonkwo: Hm. We started with a cracked pavement and a broken wrist. I think we're still there, actually — just now we know the question isn't whether the crack caused the fall. It's who decided to only test the crack.
Jonathan Ingles: Next time you hear 'this had to happen' — ask who benefits from that framing. That's the only note I'd leave myself. Good conversation.