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Cover art for Prevention saves lives but treatment sells drugs — the economic incentive mismatch

Prevention saves lives but treatment sells drugs — the economic incentive mismatch

November 19, 2026 · 13 min

Cole Bryant & Marcus Vale

Hey — tell me if this framing landed for you the same way it landed for me. Hit me. The treatment-prevention gap isn't a healthcare problem. It's a customer problem. Treatment has a customer — identifiable, sick, standing in front of a doctor with a billable diagnosis. Prevention has no customer. Its only product is…

The global healthcare system exhibits a persistent structural imbalance in which treatment investment vastly outpaces prevention spending. This divide reflects not medical merit but divergent economic incentives.

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About this episode

The global healthcare system exhibits a persistent structural imbalance in which treatment investment vastly outpaces prevention spending. This divide reflects not medical merit but divergent economic incentives.

Grounded in 5 sources
Investment in preventive health needs to be seen as a driver of economic development | PLOS Medicine ↗ · journals.plos.org
Payment mechanisms to improve prevention spending in health care settings: A policy-focused evidence brief ↗ · pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Impact of reimbursement systems on patient care – a systematic review of systematic reviews ↗ · pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Full article: Future directions for the economics of prevention ↗ · tandfonline.com
Why Prevention Loses: The Economics of Short-Termism ↗ · economicsbydesign.com
Read transcript

Marcus Vale: Hey — tell me if this framing landed for you the same way it landed for me.

Cole Bryant: Hit me.

Marcus Vale: The treatment-prevention gap isn't a healthcare problem. It's a customer problem. Treatment has a customer — identifiable, sick, standing in front of a doctor with a billable diagnosis. Prevention has no customer. Its only product is something that doesn't happen.

Cole Bryant: The non-event. Yeah, that's — wait, that's such a clean way to put it, because you can't invoice a non-event. Like, what does that charge even look like.

Marcus Vale: Every billing code in the system requires a positive observable outcome. Prevention succeeds by producing absence. The accounting infrastructure literally cannot see it.

Cole Bryant: And this is — okay, I want to put the actual number on it, because I think people hear 'prevention is underfunded' and they picture like a forty-sixty split or something. It's ninety percent of the U.S. healthcare dollar to treatment. Less than two percent to population-based prevention. That figure is from UConn Health's population health analysis. Ninety. Two.

Marcus Vale: And the pharmaceutical and medical device industry is rational in that world. Patents give you exclusivity, clinical trials get you FDA approval, Medicare and Medicaid reimburse, insurers pay. That whole chain exists for treatment. For prevention? Most interventions can't be patented. There's no reimbursement mechanism. So private capital doesn't go there.

Cole Bryant: So it's not that the industry is — bro, I want to be really clear on this — it's not moral failure. The gap is a rational output. The incentive structure tells every private actor to go toward treatment every single time.

Marcus Vale: Which makes the structural question sharper: why does the incentive architecture look the way it does, and what would have to change for it to look different?

Cole Bryant: And that's — wait, that's actually the part that breaks my brain, because it's not just that the money doesn't flow there. It's that the system can't even *see* the win. Like, if you fireproof a house and it never burns down, what's the contractor supposed to show you? There's no dramatic moment. No truck, no hoses. Nothing.

Marcus Vale: That's exactly the frame. The fire truck shows up after the blaze — everyone sees it work. The fireproofing? Invisible by design. And the accounting system is built around the fire truck.

Cole Bryant: So the problem isn't that we don't believe prevention works —

Marcus Vale: It's that there's no moment where the return shows up in a ledger. No line item. The disease that never happened cannot be billed, cannot be counted, cannot be attributed. The counterfactual doesn't exist.

Cole Bryant: So prevention advocates have the receipts but the receipts describe an *absence.*

Marcus Vale: And USPSTF — the Preventive Services Task Force — they want preventive and curative services held to the same cost-effectiveness standard. Which sounds fair. But it's structurally tilted. One side is measuring things that happened. The other is measuring things that didn't. Same ruler, different reality.

Cole Bryant: That's not a fair fight. That's like — I mean, that's not even a methodology problem, that's a category problem.

Marcus Vale: And it compounds. Because if conventional ROI frameworks structurally discount prevention returns, the Trust for America's Health data starts to make a different kind of sense. The CDC chronic disease budget is sitting below its inflation-adjusted 2015 level — roughly $1.4 billion today against a $4.5 trillion total national spend. That's not drift. That's a system that cannot justify the number it's already spending, let alone a bigger one.

Cole Bryant: Wait — $1.4 billion out of $4.5 *trillion?*

Marcus Vale: And declining in real dollars. The visibility problem becomes the funding problem. It's not political will first — it's measurement first. If you can't show the return, you can't defend the budget line.

Cole Bryant: And then — okay, actually this is the thing that gets me — the evidence review basically says prevention spending is *highly efficient* and the beneficial effects are probably *underestimated* by conventional evaluation. So the market failure is bigger than it looks because the tool we're using to measure it is broken for this exact use case.

Marcus Vale: Bigger than it appears. Standard accounting systematically undercounts prevention's value. So every budget meeting where someone asks 'what did we get for that?' — prevention loses by definition. It's a visibility problem that becomes a funding problem that becomes a visibility problem. Circular.

Cole Bryant: Which means — dude, who's even supposed to pay for something this invisible? Like, who's the buyer for a thing where the product is nothing happening?

Marcus Vale: That's the wrong pocket problem. Literally named that by the National Academy of Medicine. The entity writing the check is almost never the entity that collects the savings. And that gap — that's not a rounding error, that's the whole failure.

Cole Bryant: Wait, they actually named it that?

Marcus Vale: Wrong pocket problem. National Academy of Medicine. And the commercial insurer version of it is brutal — because it's not even long-term misalignment, it's one year. One-year contracts. The return on a prevention investment materializes over years. The plan renews in twelve months.

Cole Bryant: So the insurer is paying for — wait, let me make sure I'm picturing this right. They fund some five-year nutrition program, the savings show up in year four, but by then the person switched employers and is on a totally different plan.

Marcus Vale: Exactly. And it's not abstract. Put a benefits manager in that room — it's October, budget review, her insurer pitches a workplace nutrition and exercise program. Five-year projected savings. She knows her employees turn over every two or three years. Plan renews annually. That five-year savings line will never touch her ledger. She cuts the program. That's not callous — that's rational.

Cole Bryant: She's not wrong. That's the insane part. She's doing her job correctly and the outcome is the worst possible outcome.

Marcus Vale: And the NAM's fix — multi-year contracts — sounds obvious. Except commercial insurers have a very specific reason to stay annual. Longer commitment means longer exposure to a bad risk pool. Annual contracts let them reprice, restructure, exit. Multi-year contracts are literally bad for their business model.

Cole Bryant: So the National Academy of Medicine is saying 'just do multi-year contracts' and every insurer is saying 'that's — no, that actively hurts us.'

Marcus Vale: Correct. The fix is irrational for the actors who'd have to adopt it.

Cole Bryant: Okay and then — bro, it compounds, because even if you somehow fixed the payer side, providers are still running on fee-for-service. Like, they get paid per procedure, per visit. Volume. So a doctor preventing a hospitalization is literally generating less revenue than a doctor treating the condition after it lands. The whole provider side is rewarded for more, not for healthy.

Marcus Vale: Medicare, Medicaid — historically built the same way. Procedural volume, treatment intensity. Fee-for-service is baked into the government side too. Capitation tries to flip it — fixed per-patient payment, keep them healthy or absorb the cost — but adoption is slow.

Cole Bryant: So payers have no incentive to pay for it, providers have no incentive to do it, and — I mean, you'd think government steps in here, right? Except — and this is the part that actually gets darker — wait, we'll get there in a second, but the public sector answer is not what you'd expect.

Marcus Vale: The wrong pocket problem doesn't disappear when government is the payer. It just moves. Different pocket, same gap.

Cole Bryant: Every layer you add, it's another actor whose rational move is to not fund the thing that works.

Marcus Vale: And that's exactly where the government-fills-the-gap assumption collapses. The CDC chronic disease prevention and health promotion budget — right now — is approximately $1.4 billion. Actual current-year dollars. Below its inflation-adjusted FY2015 level. That's not erosion. That's a real-dollar cut during a period when chronic disease prevalence is climbing.

Cole Bryant: Wait — it's actually lower than 2015? Not just slower growth, actually lower?

Marcus Vale: Real purchasing power. Below 2015. And Trust for America's Health — TFAH — they've documented this trajectory. The number that makes it land: $1.4 billion against $4.5 trillion total U.S. healthcare spend. Same year.

Cole Bryant: Dude. That's — $1.4 billion out of $4.5 trillion is basically a rounding error on a rounding error.

Marcus Vale: It's a fraction of a fraction. And the kicker — six in ten U.S. adults have a chronic disease right now. So the population with chronic disease is expanding, the budget addressing it in real terms is shrinking, and the gap between those two lines is widening every year.

Cole Bryant: So why isn't there — I mean, that seems like a screaming political issue. Like, why isn't there some massive constituency pushing back on those cuts?

Marcus Vale: That's the recursive trap. The diseases that result from underfunding prevention — they develop over years. Quietly. No single dramatic event. No visible victim you can put in front of a camera the week the budget gets cut. The harm is as invisible politically as the non-event prevention was supposed to produce.

Cole Bryant: So it's not just that the market fails here — the political feedback loop fails too.

Marcus Vale: Exactly. Treatment cuts create immediate, visible pain — patients, doctors, hospital closures. Prevention cuts create nothing you can photograph. No constituency forms around a disease that hasn't happened yet. No lobby for the non-event.

Cole Bryant: And the pharmaceutical and medical device industry — they're not filling that void either because clean water infrastructure, tobacco control, nutrition policy — none of that can be patented. There's no commercial demand chain. It has to be public money, and the public money is actually shrinking.

Marcus Vale: No patent, no exclusivity, no return. Private capital rationally exits. So the whole thing defaults to the CDC, and the CDC's budget is — frankly — getting cut in real terms while the problem compounds.

Cole Bryant: Which means — wait, actually this is the thing that makes it structurally stuck — there's no paying customer, and now there's no outraged constituency either. Both failure modes at once.

Marcus Vale: And that's why structural reform is the only real path. Not moral persuasion, not better evidence — the payment architecture has to change. Capitation, Social Impact Bonds, something that creates a results-linked payment so private capital has a reason to show up. But every structural fix runs straight into the same commercial logic that built this system.

Cole Bryant: Right — because the actors who'd have to adopt the fix are the same ones for whom the fix is a bad deal. That's not a solvable problem from inside the system.

Marcus Vale: And it might just stay that way. That's the part I keep not being able to get past. Capitation flips the provider incentive — fixed per-patient, keep them healthy or absorb the cost. Social Impact Bonds bring private money in upfront, government repays only if outcomes hit. The National Academy of Medicine flags both as promising. But 'promising' and 'population scale' are two very different things. The evidence for SIBs at genuine scale just isn't there yet.

Cole Bryant: And even the Corporate Social Responsibility angle — like, pharma and medical device companies positioning as prevention partners — I mean, that sounds good on paper but there's this obvious trap sitting right underneath it, right? Because the incentive to just... rebrand earlier treatment initiation as prevention. That's always there. The patent-driven R&D machine doesn't turn off because you slap 'wellness' on the press release.

Marcus Vale: The literature actually flags that directly. Conflicts of interest — 'prevention' becoming a wrapper for earlier commercial intervention. Same revenue logic, earlier in the disease timeline.

Cole Bryant: So the rational market outcome and the worst health outcome are... the same outcome. Like, we're not describing a system that's broken. We're describing a system that's working. It's just working toward the wrong thing.

Marcus Vale: Which brings you back to the only real question left. Does rising chronic disease cost eventually create enough pressure that the redesign happens anyway — economic forcing function — or does the system just... tolerate it. Indefinitely. Six in ten adults with a chronic disease, CDC budget below 2015 in real dollars, and the gap keeps widening. At what load does the structure actually bend.

Cole Bryant: And I genuinely don't know. I came into this thinking — okay, the fix exists, someone just has to implement it. But we named every fix. Capitation, SIBs, multi-year contracts. And each one is irrational for the actor who'd have to adopt it. That's — wait, that's exactly where we started. The customer for prevention is a non-event. The customer for the fix is someone who loses by taking it.

Marcus Vale: Still the wrong pocket. All the way down. Good conversation.