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Cover art for Technologies don't just change what societies do—they change what societies can be

Technologies don't just change what societies do—they change what societies can be

November 20, 2026 · 16 min

Hugo Vance & Lila Soto

Hugo, hey — my landlord just raised the rent again and I cannot stop thinking about the specific logic of that. Yes. Tell me more. He didn't build the building. He didn't, like, invent anything. He just owns the fixed point where I need to be, and so he can charge whatever the market will…

Technological change has repeatedly reshaped the material conditions of human life—how much land can support, how territory can be defended, how labor is coordinated, and how quickly information moves—with downstream consequences for property rights, social hierarchy, and governance structures. This mechanism appears across multiple historical transitions.

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About this episode

Technological change has repeatedly reshaped the material conditions of human life—how much land can support, how territory can be defended, how labor is coordinated, and how quickly information moves—with downstream consequences for property rights, social hierarchy, and governance structures. This mechanism appears across multiple historical transitions.

Grounded in 12 sources
Commodified Land, Dangerous Water: Colonial Perceptions of Riverine Bengal ↗ · doi.org
Technology and Global Social Change | Springer Nature Link ↗ · link.springer.com
The impact of technological advancement on culture and society ↗ · pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Full article: The role of science and technology in reconstructing human social history: effect of technology change on society ↗ · tandfonline.com
An Analysis of the History and Development of the Printing Press as Critique of Technological Determinism | CUJ ↗ · cujournal.ie
Vanua as Environment: Conservation, Farming, and Development in Waitabu, Fiji ↗ · d-scholarship.pitt.edu
The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies ↗ · dhi.ac.uk
Technological Determinism ↗ · faculty.marshall.usc.edu
Understanding Feudal Land Concessions and Grants in Historical and Legal Contexts - Habevio ↗ · habevio.com
Understanding Feudal Land Rights and Feudal Duties in Medieval Law - Habevio ↗ · habevio.com
The Medieval Lord’s Watermill Monopoly: The Dark Origins of Forced Facility Fees and Taxes - KORI Story ↗ · koristory.com
The Dilemma of Technological Determinism ↗ · memoof.me
Read transcript

Lila Soto: Hugo, hey — my landlord just raised the rent again and I cannot stop thinking about the specific logic of that.

Hugo Vance: Yes. Tell me more.

Lila Soto: He didn't build the building. He didn't, like, invent anything. He just owns the fixed point where I need to be, and so he can charge whatever the market will hold. And I kept thinking — that's so old. That's not a modern landlord thing.

Hugo Vance: It is exactly as old as the watermill.

Lila Soto: Which is — yeah, that's where we're going today. The watermill, the stirrup, Thomas Newcomen's 1712 steam engine. The question underneath all of it: does the technology actually decide what happens next, or does power just use it as an excuse?

Hugo Vance: Well. Here is the thing that stops me cold every time I teach this. A medieval lord did not invent the watermill. He didn't engineer it, didn't commission it in most cases. The mill existed — it concentrated mechanical energy at one fixed geographic point, so grain had to come to it. And the lord looked at that fact and made a choice. He could let peasants grind freely, or he could extract a fee from every sack. He chose to extract.

Lila Soto: And that choice became law.

Hugo Vance: That choice, repeated independently by lords across Europe, became what we now call forced facility fees — a legal category that did not exist before. One person's decision to extract became an institution. That is the pattern I want us to sit with.

Lila Soto: Okay but — mm, the word 'independently' is doing a lot of work there. Are you saying they all just arrived at the same extraction logic without talking to each other?

Hugo Vance: I am. And that is precisely what demands explanation. The stirrup is the same story — mounted combat becomes dramatically more effective, and feudal land tenure emerges as the institutional response. Conditional grants of land to warriors who could field cavalry. Military service and land rights, mutually reinforcing. Same logic, different technology.

Lila Soto: So Newcomen's 1712 pump — that fits this sequence too?

Hugo Vance: It does, yes. Newcomen solves a flooding problem in coal mines — that is all he set out to do. But deeper extraction becomes possible, and the chain that follows leads eventually to James Watt, to factory machinery, to urbanization. No one planned that chain. The incentive-to-institution pipeline, you might call it. Now — whether the technology forces any of that, or whether power simply reaches for it when the opportunity appears, that is the question I don't think we've honestly answered.

Lila Soto: And that pipeline — the incentive becoming an institution — that's the thing I want to understand more concretely. Because I keep almost getting it and then losing the thread.

Hugo Vance: Think of it like a room with a weight limit. The ceiling is the material constraint — how much the floor can hold. If that limit doubles, you don't have to put more furniture in. But now it's worth building a bigger couch. The technology raises the ceiling. The social rearrangement is what people choose to put in the room.

Lila Soto: Okay — yeah. That landed.

Hugo Vance: The heavy plow — same logic. Before it, the carrying capacity of a given patch of land, the maximum it could support, was set by what you could turn with a light implement. The heavy plow breaks heavier soils. Suddenly that ceiling lifts, settlement gets denser, you generate a surplus, and a surplus is worth governing. River valleys that couldn't sustain a city now can. And what do you get? Specialized governance. Administrators, taxes, hierarchies — not because anyone designed them, but because the room could now hold the weight.

Lila Soto: But who decides what furniture goes in?

Hugo Vance: That is exactly the right question. And I want to hold it one moment — yes, we come to it — but first the ceiling change itself needs to be established, because I think people skip past it too fast. The stirrup is the other case. Defensibility of territory — how well you can actually hold ground — shifts when cavalry becomes dramatically more cost-effective. Mounted warriors become the decisive military unit. And a ruler who needs mounted warriors has to pay for them somehow. You can't pay them in cash if cash is scarce. So you pay in land. Conditional tenure. That is feudal land tenure, and it did not emerge from ideology. It emerged from the math of fielding a knight on horseback.

Lila Soto: The land grant is basically a paycheck denominated in acres.

Hugo Vance: Precisely. And then — this is where institutional calcification becomes visible — the warrior's children inherit the land even after the military logic has changed. The original incentive fades. The institution stays. It has become normal, then legal, then ancestral.

Lila Soto: Oh — so the furniture outlasts the reason you bought it.

Hugo Vance: Yes. And energy geography is the same pattern at the industrial scale. Before steam, you built near a river or a forest — the mill needed water, the forge needed charcoal. Production was dispersed because energy was dispersed. Then James Watt's improvements make the steam engine portable and efficient enough to run machinery, and I mean actually run looms, not just pump water the way Newcomen's 1712 engine was doing. Now you can concentrate labor anywhere. The geographic constraint is gone. And the room is suddenly enormous — so you fill it with factories, with workers in tenements, with a wage-labor class that did not exist before because the cottage was the unit of production.

Lila Soto: So the technology doesn't tell you what to do. It tells you what's now possible.

Hugo Vance: Exactly that. What becomes possible tends to become profitable, which tends to become normal, which tends to become law. That is the full sequence. The ceiling change is real and consequential — but the furniture question, who decides what goes in the room, that is where I think the more uncomfortable answer lives.

Lila Soto: But wait — the furniture-goes-in story breaks down with the stirrup, doesn't it? Because historians still can't actually agree that the stirrup caused feudalism. Like, that's the contested case.

Hugo Vance: It is precisely the contested case. And that is why I keep returning to it — not because it proves the mechanism, but because it warns against it.

Lila Soto: Warns against what, exactly?

Hugo Vance: Mono-causal thinking. The stirrup improved mounted combat — that part is not contested. Heavy cavalry becomes a militarily viable, dominant formation. The feudal incentive structure follows: land for warriors who can field horses, military service and tenure mutually reinforcing. The sequence looks clean. But then you ask — why didn't every society that adopted the stirrup produce feudalism on the same timetable? And the clean story cracks.

Lila Soto: Oh — that's the break I didn't see coming.

Hugo Vance: And the watermill makes it even sharper. I think this is the part most people miss — watermills in medieval communes were often collectively owned. The monopoly was not automatic. Some villages held the mill together and distributed access. The lord's claim had to be fought for, legally and sometimes physically.

Lila Soto: Wait — so the same technology, one village gets extraction, one village gets a cooperative?

Hugo Vance: Same technology, opposite institution. Which is — I mean, that's the tension between hard and soft technological determinism in one image. Hard TD says the technology drives the outcome autonomously. Soft TD says, well, the causal weight is real, but it only becomes clearly visible across long time frames and large aggregates — at the level of one Provençal village in 1250, social forces can override it entirely.

Lila Soto: And the social constructionist goes further — existing power relations determine which way the technology cuts in the first place.

Hugo Vance: Yes. And I'll concede that tension is genuine. I don't have a clean resolution. The stirrup case is the canonical example in the historiography precisely because nobody can fully resolve it.

Lila Soto: Mm. So what does vanua do to this? Because I keep thinking — Fiji's vanua system, land and people and community and custom all inseparable. That's not just a different property rule. That's a different ontology of what land even is.

Hugo Vance: It is a structural challenge to universality, not a footnote. The incentive-to-institution pipeline — the mechanism we've been tracing — is most visible in agrarian state-level societies with written property law. Where vanua operates, the same material environment does not produce the same institutional response, because the cultural and political framework is fundamentally different. The mechanism isn't a law of history. It's particular.

Lila Soto: Which means when we apply the same logic going forward — to, say, digital infrastructure — we might be making the stirrup mistake in real time. And that's before we even get to the case where the mechanism ran without any technology at all, which — that part gets genuinely uncomfortable.

Hugo Vance: Indeed. The incentive-to-institution pipeline can be triggered by law alone, with no tool change whatsoever. That's the tricky part to examine directly.

Lila Soto: Law alone — yeah. So walk me through that. Because you've got this whole chain from Newcomen forward and I want to see where it snaps.

Hugo Vance: Take a woman in a Nottinghamshire cottage, 1780. Sitting at her mother's hand loom — the work is slow, it's hers, the household is the unit of production. Twenty miles away, Watt's refinements of Newcomen's 1712 pump are now running actual machinery. She doesn't know that yet. But the enclosure movement has already begun privatizing the common land her family grazed animals on. That's the material constraint changing — not from a tool, from a law. And once the commons are gone, the cottage economy has no floor under it.

Lila Soto: She loses the land before she ever sees a factory.

Hugo Vance: Exactly. Enclosure supplies the displaced labor. Steam — Watt's steam, the kind that actually drives looms — supplies the centralized production point. The two forces meet and you get the textile factory. Cottage production moves to wage labor, urban tenement, a class of factory owners on one side and wage workers on the other. That is the full chain. Newcomen to Watt to enclosure to industrial class structure.

Lila Soto: And that class structure — factory owners and wage workers — that's not just a description. That becomes the defining shape of what comes after.

Hugo Vance: It becomes the furniture that outlasts the reason you bought it, yes. The class formation calcifies. And — I mean, this is the part worth pausing on — energy geography is what made urban concentration not just possible but economically compelling. Before Watt, you built near rivers. Mills needed water. The factory had to be where the energy was. Steam freed production from that constraint entirely, so the city became the rational choice. You could now put ten thousand workers in one place.

Lila Soto: Okay but — mm, that's the technology half. What breaks the clean story?

Hugo Vance: Bengal. 19th-century British legal intervention, no technology shift whatsoever. What they did was engineer permanent boundaries between land and water in a riverine landscape that had always been fluid — seasonal, negotiable. New property frameworks, new legal categories, new hierarchies. Same outcome as enclosure: displaced communities, restructured tenure, new legal subjects. The mechanism ran entirely through law.

Lila Soto: Wait — permanent land-water boundaries in a delta system? That's — that's almost violent as a legal act.

Hugo Vance: It is. And Ethiopia is the same pattern — colonial land law restructuring property relations without any tool change driving it. Which is what forces the revision I find genuinely uncomfortable: the mechanism isn't about technology. Technology is one way to alter material constraints. Law is another. The real engine is power over constraints — whoever can redraw the ceiling controls what furniture gets built.

Lila Soto: So technology isn't the cause. It's — kind of a delivery mechanism for the same underlying move.

Hugo Vance: I'd say: technology is the most legible version of the move. When a steam engine replaces a hand loom, the constraint change is visible, physical, undeniable. When a colonial surveyor draws a line in Bengal, it's the same structural logic — but it looks like paperwork. That's why we undercount it.

Lila Soto: And the woman at the loom in 1780 — she's not watching a machine. She's watching her commons disappear. The law came first.

Hugo Vance: The law came first. And that, I think, is the part we still don't understand fully — how often what looks like a technology story is actually a power story that found a tool to point at.

Lila Soto: I think that's the thing I came in not quite seeing. We were asking what the technology does. And the honest answer is — it creates the conditions. It raises the ceiling. But someone still has to walk through the door that opens, and that someone always has interests.

Hugo Vance: And the door they walk through tends to stay open in one direction. The feudal land grant outlasted cavalry dominance by centuries. The factory wage structure outlasted the specific energy geography that made river-based mills necessary. That's institutional calcification — the choice made at the moment of transition casts a very long shadow.

Lila Soto: The furniture outlasts the reason you bought it. Yeah. That's — I mean, that actually lands differently now that I've sat with it for a whole conversation.

Hugo Vance: Which is, I think, why the moment of transition is always worth examining. Not the technology. The choice.

Lila Soto: And whether anyone else had a say.

Hugo Vance: Indeed. That's an honest place to stop — not because we've resolved it, but because the question is finally the right shape.