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The 1973 oil shock and the Bretton Woods successor: how petroleum pricing stabilized dollar supremacy

November 13, 2026 · 13 min

Iris Holm & Lila Soto

Hey, good to be back — I have to tell you something that's been sitting weirdly with me since last week. Go on. I was reading about Saudi Arabia and I hit this line — June 2024, Saudi Arabia just... didn't renew its commitment to exclusive dollar oil pricing. And my first thought was, okay,…

The petrodollar system emerged in the aftermath of two simultaneous shocks: the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods gold-dollar exchange standard and the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo triggered by the Arab-Israeli war.

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About this episode

The petrodollar system emerged in the aftermath of two simultaneous shocks: the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods gold-dollar exchange standard and the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo triggered by the Arab-Israeli war.

Grounded in 10 sources
Petrodollars: Myth and Reality | Council on Foreign Relations ↗ · cfr.org
If the Petrodollar Ends, What Comes Next? Scenarios for U.S. Adaptation in a De-Dollarizing World ↗ · medium.com
The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and ... - David E. Spiro - Google Books ↗ · books.google.com
The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony by David E. Spiro | Hardcover | Cornell University Press ↗ · cornellpress.cornell.edu
Oil Money by David M. Wight | Hardcover | Cornell University Press ↗ · cornellpress.cornell.edu
Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations ↗ · digital.library.unt.edu
Petrodollar recycling - Wikipedia ↗ · en.wikipedia.org
Hormuz crisis accelerates petrodollar decline – GIS Reports ↗ · gisreportsonline.com
Petrodollar under pressure from Brics currency, energy transition - Green Central Banking ↗ · greencentralbanking.com
The permanence of power : postcolonial sovereignty, the energy crisis, and the rise of American neoliberal diplomacy, 1967 - 1976 ↗ · hdl.handle.net
Read transcript

Lila Soto: Hey, good to be back — I have to tell you something that's been sitting weirdly with me since last week.

Iris Holm: Go on.

Lila Soto: I was reading about Saudi Arabia and I hit this line — June 2024, Saudi Arabia just... didn't renew its commitment to exclusive dollar oil pricing. And my first thought was, okay, that's the earthquake, right? That's the story. But then I kept reading and — nothing happened. The system kept running. Oil still priced in dollars. Nobody seemed to notice.

Iris Holm: Almost nobody noticed. That's the part that actually matters.

Lila Soto: Right — and that silence, I keep wondering what's underneath it. Like, if the petrodollar was an iron lock the US imposed on the world, shouldn't the removal of the original commitment have... broken something?

Iris Holm: That's exactly the question. And to even start answering it you have to go back — 1973, the Yom Kippur War, the OPEC oil embargo. That's the moment energy became explicitly geopolitical. That's when the arrangement crystallized.

Lila Soto: And what crystallized is — kind of strange, actually? Because by 1975 every OPEC member was settling oil sales in US dollars. Every single one. And there's no binding treaty anyone can point to that made that happen.

Iris Holm: No formal treaty. Bilateral deals, institutional habit, financial incentives. The petrodollar system is real — oil priced and settled in dollars, every oil-importing nation holding dollar reserves to buy energy — but it was never contractual. It was something else.

Lila Soto: So what do we call it when a system that was never formally built... also can't be formally dismantled?

Iris Holm: That's the whole problem. The standard story says the US engineered this lock and Saudi Arabia held the key. But Saudi Arabia returned the key last year and the lock didn't open. So either the story was wrong, or the lock rewired itself. And I genuinely don't know which.

Lila Soto: And that 'something else' — David Spiro calls it this in 'The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony'. His whole argument is that there was a secret bilateral arrangement between the US and Saudi Arabia to channel the oil surpluses specifically into US Treasury securities. Like, not just dollar pricing — the recycling loop.

Iris Holm: Right. The recycling is the second half of the mechanism. Oil priced in dollars gets you structural demand for the currency. But petrodollar recycling — Saudi surplus wealth flowing back into US Treasuries — that's what actually funds American deficits.

Lila Soto: So the everyday version of this is — imagine every grocery store on earth only accepts one currency. You have to get that currency before you can eat. That's the oil-dollar link. But then also, the grocery chain takes your payment and immediately loans it back to the currency's government.

Iris Holm: That's the whole system in two sentences. Every nation buying oil has to hold dollars first. And the dollars that oil exporters collect go back into US Treasuries. America runs a structural tab at the global bar and the bartender reinvests the tips.

Lila Soto: Okay but — here's where Spiro's framing gets complicated. Christopher Dietrich's work on OPEC sovereignty claims shows that through this same period, 1967 to 1976, OPEC members were actively asserting permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. They weren't passive recipients of US architecture. So how secret and bilateral was any of this, really?

Iris Holm: That's the tension. Saudi Arabia agreed to invest the surplus in US Treasuries — that part's documented — but OPEC as a collective was simultaneously insisting on sovereign control. Those two things coexist.

Lila Soto: Which means the US-as-architect story is... I mean, it's not wrong exactly, but it flattens something. These were actors with their own leverage.

Iris Holm: And the architecture itself — look, Bretton Woods collapses in 1971. The gold anchor is gone. The dollar is suddenly untethered. What fills that vacuum isn't a treaty. It's a scramble. By 1975 every OPEC member settles in dollars, but no one signed a document creating that outcome.

Lila Soto: It crystallized under pressure rather than got designed.

Iris Holm: Exactly. And that distinction matters enormously. Because if it was designed, you can dismantle it. If it crystallized — the CFR's argument is relevant here — liquid currency conversion markets mean nations could already hold euros and convert on settlement. The structural lock was never as tight as the story required.

Lila Soto: Oh — so the lock was real but the key was always kind of... available? Nations just kept choosing not to use it?

Iris Holm: That's the question that breaks the standard framing. If you could always convert currencies and buy oil anyway, what kept everyone in dollars for fifty years? Not coercion. Something else. Coordination, habit, Treasuries being the deepest and most liquid market on earth.

Lila Soto: So the missing paperwork isn't a gap in the archive — it's evidence that the system was never contractual to begin with. And that reframes what Saudi Arabia actually walked away from last year.

Iris Holm: And that's exactly what the recycling loop tells you. Because the pricing rule gets all the attention, but the deeper mechanism is what happens to the dollars *after* the sale.

Lila Soto: The surplus had to go somewhere.

Iris Holm: Right. Saudi Arabia is sitting on massive dollar surpluses. And US Treasury markets are the deepest, most liquid destination on earth. So the money flows back in. David Wight's framing in 'Oil Money' is that this recycling is actually how oil wealth became the scaffolding of US global financial empire through the seventies and eighties. Not the pricing rule. The reinvestment loop.

Lila Soto: Oh — so the pricing rule created the surplus, and the surplus created the Treasury demand, almost... independently of whether oil stayed dollar-priced?

Iris Holm: That's the part the standard story skips. The recycling deepened dollar demand on its own track.

Lila Soto: There's this image I can't shake — a central bank official in Jakarta, late 1975. Three months after OPEC's full switch to dollar settlement. She's authorizing a crude purchase. And, I mean, nobody from Washington called her. She didn't sign anything with the US government. But every contract on her desk is denominated in dollars. Every counterparty expects dollars. The switching cost isn't just currency conversion — it's rebuilding an entire financial ecosystem she doesn't have.

Iris Holm: Network effects. That's the mechanism.

Lila Soto: And OPEC's anchor on that is Saudi Arabia specifically, right? Because Saudi Arabia's dominant position inside OPEC meant the broader membership followed its reinvestment pattern into US Treasuries.

Iris Holm: Saudi Arabia sets the floor. Everyone else orients to it. So every oil-importing nation — Jakarta, Nairobi, Seoul — has to accumulate dollar reserves just to buy energy. That creates persistent global demand for dollars that has nothing to do with whether there's a formal treaty or not. The dollar reserve demand becomes self-reinforcing.

Lila Soto: Which is — yeah, that's kind of terrifying actually? Like the system generates its own gravity.

Iris Holm: And here's what that means for the coercion question — if every major market participant already prices in dollars, the switching cost for the *system* stays high even when any individual actor could technically convert. No one imposed that. It just... compounded.

Lila Soto: And what's underneath that compounding — whether the recycling loop was actually as durable as the story requires — things get genuinely strange there, and I think we need to get into what Saudi Arabia's actual current account looked like over those decades.

Iris Holm: The number surprises people.

Lila Soto: Okay but — by 2000, Saudi Arabia's cumulative current account since 1970 was roughly in balance. Early surpluses, later deficits. It basically washed out.

Iris Holm: Right. Which means the recycling narrative — the one where petrodollar surpluses continuously flood into US Treasuries, decade after decade — that may have been a one-decade story.

Lila Soto: One decade dressed up as structural law.

Iris Holm: So what actually created the durability? Because something did. The CFR's argument is that liquid euro-dollar conversion markets meant you never had to hold dollars in the first place. Hold euros, convert at settlement, done. That should dissolve the whole lock-in.

Lila Soto: But central banks didn't do that. I mean — for fifty years, they behaved as if dollar reserves were mandatory. Even when the technical exit existed.

Iris Holm: And that behavior produced real structural effects. Regardless of the optionality.

Lila Soto: So the lock is behavioral, not contractual. Which is — huh, that's actually harder to dismantle than a treaty.

Iris Holm: Harder and softer at the same time. No single document to void. But also no single document to enforce. What holds it is interlocking institutional factors — the depth of US capital markets, American military presence in the Gulf, commodity market conventions. Take any one piece out and the others remain.

Lila Soto: Which is what Saudi Arabia's non-renewal actually proved, kind of accidentally.

Iris Holm: Exactly. One piece removed. System continues. That's institutional hegemony, not contractual. And the BRICS challenge runs straight into the same wall — you need not just a new currency, you need an entire rival financial ecosystem of comparable depth to US Treasury markets. That doesn't exist.

Lila Soto: Oh — so de-dollarization isn't impossible, it's just that the network-effect barrier isn't the dollar, it's the ecosystem around the dollar.

Iris Holm: That's the distinction the collapse narrative keeps missing. BRICS pressure is real. But replacing a currency and replacing an ecosystem are completely different problems.

Lila Soto: So what would have to be true for the ecosystem to actually shift? Like — is there a threshold, or does it just... erode?

Iris Holm: Frankly — the energy transition may be the real variable. If oil's share of global energy drops far enough, the whole oil-dollar pricing convention matters less. The foundation doesn't collapse. It just becomes load-bearing for a smaller structure.

Lila Soto: And that's the part that keeps not resolving for me. Because if the oil-dollar link becomes less load-bearing as oil's share of global energy just... quietly shrinks — the system doesn't collapse dramatically. It kind of recedes. And nobody holds a ceremony for that.

Iris Holm: No announcement. No treaty to void. The same way it was never formally built.

Lila Soto: Which is — yeah, that's actually what Saudi Arabia's 2024 non-renewal already showed us, in miniature. The most concrete institutional step away from the original bilateral arrangement, and the system didn't flinch. And I'm still not sure if that's reassuring or quietly unsettling.

Iris Holm: Both, I think. Institutional depth is real. But it also means no single event will announce when the system actually ends. You just look up one day and the foundation is load-bearing for something smaller than you thought.

Lila Soto: So the right question was never 'when does the petrodollar collapse.' It's — under what conditions does a competing equilibrium become more rational? Like, what would it take for central banks and oil exporters to genuinely prefer something else?

Iris Holm: Comparable financial depth. Security guarantees. Network adoption at scale. BRICS doesn't have all three simultaneously. That's the wall. And until someone does — the dollar system keeps running, maybe on inertia alone.

Lila Soto: Inertia shaped by fifty years of every counterparty already being inside it. I mean — that Jakarta central banker in 1975 didn't choose the dollar. She just found it everywhere she looked. And so did the next generation, and the one after.

Iris Holm: And we still don't have a clean answer. Which is probably the honest place to stop. Neither of us is predicting the end of this — we're just finally asking the right question.