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The structural instability when a second peer power emerges to challenge hegemony

November 15, 2026 · 10 min

Jonathan Ingles & Ben Okonkwo

Before you set anything up — I want to put a number on the table, because it reframes everything we're about to say. Interesting, go ahead. Project mBridge: fifty-five point five billion dollars processed by 2025. That's the number China's allies cite as proof de-dollarization has real infrastructure behind it. Now — you tell me…

A unipolar international system—defined by one state's overwhelming combination of military reach, economic capacity, technological leadership, and institutional influence—emerged most clearly after the Soviet Union's collapse, leaving the United States as the sole superpower.

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About this episode

A unipolar international system—defined by one state's overwhelming combination of military reach, economic capacity, technological leadership, and institutional influence—emerged most clearly after the Soviet Union's collapse, leaving the United States as the sole superpower.

Grounded in 12 sources
Why US–China relations have not escalated yet: Power rise, power transition, and perceptions of resolve | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core ↗ · cambridge.org
Economic openness, power, and conflict ↗ · doi.org
Power Transition Theory and the Essence of Revisionism ↗ · acsu.buffalo.edu
mBridge and the Emergence of CBDC-Driven De-Dollarization | AInvest ↗ · ainvest.com
Global Economic Fragmentation Becomes Irreversible Through Alternative BRICS Systems - 21.05.2026 | BURSA.RO ↗ · bursa.ro
“Realisms at war”: Robert Gilpin's political economy of hegemonic ... ↗ · ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu
The rise of Middle Powers in a fractured international order ↗ · economicsandpeace.org
Hegemonic stability theory - Wikipedia ↗ · en.wikipedia.org
Hegemony - Wikipedia ↗ · en.wikipedia.org
Rethinking polarity for the twenty-first century: perceptions of order in international society ↗ · etheses.bham.ac.uk
American Unipolarity: The Uneven Distribution of Power ↗ · globalpoliticsreview.com
2. Past Eras of Great Power Competition: Historical Insights and Implications > National Defense University Press > News Article View ↗ · ndupress.ndu.edu
Read transcript

Jonathan Ingles: Before you set anything up — I want to put a number on the table, because it reframes everything we're about to say.

Ben Okonkwo: Interesting, go ahead.

Jonathan Ingles: Project mBridge: fifty-five point five billion dollars processed by 2025. That's the number China's allies cite as proof de-dollarization has real infrastructure behind it. Now — you tell me if that number is early-adoption physics or permanent marginality, because SWIFT moves five trillion a day.

Ben Okonkwo: Hm. So those are genuinely different stories and I don't think the number alone settles which one it is. But here's what I think does — Saudi Arabia walked out of mBridge in 2024. Mid-construction. And ninety-five percent of mBridge's volume is denominated in e-CNY, which means without Gulf participation this thing isn't a neutral platform, it's a Chinese ledger with international branding.

Jonathan Ingles: The infrastructure exists. The coalition to make it matter doesn't. That's the tell.

Ben Okonkwo: Now — and this is what I actually want to dig into — if you frame hegemonic decline as a race, the United States accumulating overstretch costs on one side, rivals building parallel systems on the other, then Saudi Arabia's exit is a data point about which side of that race is ahead right now. It doesn't mean the race is over.

Jonathan Ingles: Which is the more interesting question. Not whether CIPS or mBridge exist — they do. Whether the BRICS coalition, or whatever you want to call it, can hold together long enough for those systems to reach the volume where they actually constrain American structural leverage. That's the race.

Ben Okonkwo: But the race framing actually obscures the mechanism that started it. Because the United States didn't just tolerate China's rise through the open system — it built the system that made the rise possible. That's the thing Robert Gilpin called the hegemonic paradox, and it's genuinely strange when you sit with it.

Jonathan Ingles: Say it plainly.

Ben Okonkwo: It's a landlord who renovates the whole building to attract tenants, watches the tenants get rich, and then the tenants buy the building out from under him. The renovation was both the smart move and the trap. Same move, two consequences.

Jonathan Ingles: And after 1991 — after the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States was the only pole left — that's exactly the bet Washington made. Build the open order, everybody benefits, the hegemon benefits most. China plugs in, runs differential growth rates that dwarf American GDP growth for two straight decades, and now we're having this conversation.

Ben Okonkwo: Right — but here's what I actually find interesting about that. Power Transition Theory says a rising state becomes genuinely dangerous when growth rates diverge, dissatisfaction builds, and the costs of escalation start looking manageable. All three of those conditions have arguably been met by China for fifteen years. So why no escalation?

Jonathan Ingles: Because CIPS and mBridge are the escalation.

Ben Okonkwo: That's — yeah, actually. The alternative infrastructure might be the form challenge takes when kinetic escalation is still too costly. Which means Gilpin's paradox goes one layer deeper than it looks — the openness doesn't just grow the rival, it also channels the rivalry into institutional competition instead of military competition.

Jonathan Ingles: And that's the trap that's hard to see in real time. Because institutional competition looks like cooperation until it doesn't. The United States spent thirty years mistaking China building inside the system for China accepting the system.

Ben Okonkwo: So the hegemonic paradox isn't just that openness creates rivals — it's that openness creates rivals who are structurally incentivized to look like partners until they've accumulated enough capability to stop pretending.

Jonathan Ingles: And that's exactly where the fiscal math breaks down. Because once you've got rivals who look like partners, you've built a military and institutional footprint sized to police a system that's being quietly hollowed out underneath you. That's not metaphor — that's strategic overstretch as a budget problem.

Ben Okonkwo: Right — and the mechanism is specific. The United States' global commitments grow faster than the economic base that funds them. That's Gilpin's overstretch claim, and what makes it concrete now is that you've got BRICS nations building redundant infrastructure precisely to raise the cost of enforcement, not to replace the system outright.

Jonathan Ingles: Degrade, not replace. That's the distinction.

Ben Okonkwo: Exactly that. And here's where I want to get concrete — think about a mid-sized Brazilian agricultural exporter in 2024. Settling a soybean contract. They're not ideologically committed to de-dollarization, they're just routing through CIPS in RMB because after the 2022 Russian reserve freeze, dollar-denominated settlement carries sanctions anxiety as a real operational cost. That's not geopolitics, that's a mundane routing decision.

Jonathan Ingles: Multiply that by a few million contracts and you've shifted the architecture without anyone declaring anything.

Ben Okonkwo: And CIPS is — now, the number here matters — it's processing roughly thirty percent of Belt and Road Initiative trade. That's not marginal. That's functional. And Russia and China are conducting about ninety percent of their bilateral trade in local currencies at this point. So SPFS, CIPS, the RMB settlement — these aren't aspirational, they're operational.

Jonathan Ingles: Wait — SPFS hit 556 member organizations by end of 2023. Across twenty countries. Russia built that after sanctions. That's the proof of concept that makes every secondary power watching think — okay, we can survive outside the dollar system if we have to.

Ben Okonkwo: And that survival signal is what raises enforcement costs for Washington. Because now containing Russia, managing China, watching the Brazilian exporter route around SWIFT — those are three simultaneous theaters, and the fiscal base funding all that enforcement isn't growing at the rate the commitments are. That's the overstretch trap.

Jonathan Ingles: The rivals don't need to win. They just need enforcement to get expensive enough that the hegemon starts making trade-offs.

Ben Okonkwo: Which is — honestly, that's where the coalition question becomes load-bearing, and I think it's the part we haven't cracked yet. Whether Saudi Arabia's exit from mBridge and the volume gap between CIPS and SWIFT mean this tips or just plateaus — that's the question that actually determines whether overstretch is fatal or manageable.

Jonathan Ingles: But even that framing — tips or plateaus — might be too generous. Because Saudi Arabia didn't just walk out of mBridge on principle. They walked out because staying in meant subordinating their settlement infrastructure to Beijing's ledger. Ninety-five percent e-CNY. That's not a neutral platform, that's a dependency swap.

Ben Okonkwo: Right — but then the $300 billion reserve freeze is the complication. Because that event told every Gulf central bank that dollar-system dependence also carries a dependency risk. So they're not choosing safety versus risk. They're choosing which kind of risk.

Jonathan Ingles: And they chose to stay exposed to Washington rather than exposed to Beijing. That's the coalition fragility in one sentence.

Ben Okonkwo: Which is — actually, that's the part I want to sit with. Because Hegemonic Stability Theory has this prediction that institutions outlast the hegemon that built them. They take on a life of their own. So even if US relative power is genuinely eroding, the dollar-centered architecture might just... persist through inertia. Saudi Arabia's exit is consistent with that — they're not fleeing the dollar, they're declining to build its replacement.

Jonathan Ingles: Hold on. That's a massive distinction.

Ben Okonkwo: It is. SPFS has 556 members, SWIFT has 11,000 — Russia built approximately five percent of that network under maximum sanctions pressure, which is genuine traction. But five percent isn't replacement velocity. And if even sanctioned states can't pull secondary powers into the alternative stack, the inertia argument looks pretty strong.

Jonathan Ingles: Frankly, that's the number. 556 versus 11,000. Under existential sanctions pressure Russia built five percent. That's the ceiling of what coercion produces in terms of coalition expansion.

Ben Okonkwo: So the honest level of certainty here is — the alternative systems are real and operational, but the coalition needed to give them systemic weight is... I mean, it's not forming at the speed the infrastructure is being built. Those are on completely different timelines.

Jonathan Ingles: Which means the question isn't whether the architecture exists. It's whether any secondary power is willing to absorb the cost of actually committing to it. And right now the answer is — they'd rather keep their options open.

Ben Okonkwo: And that hedging might be the equilibrium, not a transitional phase. That's the part that doesn't settle cleanly.

Jonathan Ingles: And that might be the most destabilizing version of this — not a clean handoff to a new hegemon, not multipolarity in the textbook sense. Just... the United States still holding structural leverage over some states while others have quietly routed around it. A multiplex, not a transition.

Ben Okonkwo: Which means de-dollarization as a process, not an event. The honest level of certainty the evidence licenses is 'eroding,' not 'replaced.' And whether that erosion tips into something genuinely reordered depends on coalition cohesion that — I mean, we've just spent an hour showing doesn't exist yet at the required scale.

Jonathan Ingles: Fragmented and overlapping. That's the world.

Ben Okonkwo: Genuinely unresolved. Which, frankly, is the right place to land — I'd rather sit in that discomfort than hand you a verdict the evidence doesn't support. Good conversation.