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The structural mechanisms that limit presidential power — and why they sometimes fail

July 25, 2026 · 11 min

Juniper Vale & Hope Sterling

In January 2025, the executive branch froze $410 billion in congressionally appropriated funds — despite the Appropriations Clause, the Appointments Clause, and judicial review all being intact. None of these three constitutional checks operate automatically; each requires Congress or the courts to actively invoke them, and that political will was absent.

The U.S. Constitution divides governmental authority among three branches — Congress (Article I), the President (Article II), and the federal courts (Article III) — and establishes structural mechanisms that limit executive power regardless of who holds office. Three mechanisms are central.

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About this episode

The United States Constitution contains three structural mechanisms designed to prevent any president from accumulating unchecked power: the Appropriations Clause, which bars money from leaving the Treasury without a congressional law; the Appointments Clause, which gives the Senate confirmation authority over federal officers; and judicial review, codified through the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows courts to invalidate unlawful executive action. Together they're meant to cover every phase — before an action starts, while it's being executed, and after the fact. So why, in January 2025, did $410 billion in congressionally appropriated funds end up frozen? This episode works through that question carefully, drawing on constitutional text, congressional research, and legal scholarship to map where the mechanisms actually live and where they depend on something the text never guaranteed: political will. It traces the history of impoundment from Nixon through the 1974 Impoundment Control Act, examines how party-line confirmation votes have reshaped the Appointments Clause in practice, and looks at what legal scholars say courts can — and can't — actually do when the executive resists. The conclusion is uncomfortable: the brakes are real, they're intact, and they require someone to reach for them. That part was never written down anywhere.

Frequently asked

What constitutional limits exist on presidential power over federal spending?

The Appropriations Clause, Article I Section 9, is the primary limit: no money may leave the Treasury without an act of Congress. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 reinforced this after President Nixon declined to spend appropriated funds. Despite these provisions, the executive branch froze $410 billion in appropriated funds starting January 2025.

What is the Impoundment Control Act and why was it passed?

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was passed by Congress specifically to stop presidents from refusing to spend appropriated funds — a practice Nixon used broadly. The law establishes formal procedures and sharp restrictions on executive impoundment of congressionally approved money. As of January 2025, it remains on the books but enforcement still requires political action.

Why do checks and balances fail even when they are constitutionally intact?

Constitutional checks on the presidency — the Appropriations Clause, Senate confirmation, and judicial review — fail not because the law changes but because none operate automatically. Each requires Congress or the courts to actively invoke them. Scholars call the underlying problem norm erosion: the informal restraints that historically kept branches from testing legal limits stop holding without any formal rule breaking.

What does the Appointments Clause actually require for federal officers?

The Appointments Clause, Article II of the Constitution, requires Senate confirmation for principal federal officers including cabinet secretaries and federal judges. The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Lucia v. SEC (2018) that Senate confirmation is the exclusive constitutional method for placing such officers. When one party controls both the White House and Senate, confirmation votes become a simple-majority formality.

Can courts stop a president from ignoring appropriations law?

Federal courts can order executive compliance with appropriations law under the Administrative Procedure Act, which codifies judicial review of executive actions. However, courts have no independent enforcement mechanism if the executive resists a court order. Legal scholars Baude, Bray, and Levy have noted this directly: judicial review is a real check that stops working if the executive declines to comply.

Grounded in 12 sources
Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from ... · cambridge.org
Price_Formatted_PDF · review.law.stanford.edu
Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies | Congress.gov | Library of Congress · congress.gov
The Appointments Clause: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions · congress.gov
Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions | Congress.gov | Library of Congress · congress.gov
An Introduction to Judicial Review of Federal · congress.gov
Separation of Powers in Action - U.S. v. Alvarez · uscourts.gov
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS · budgetcounsel.com
On the Expansion of Executive Power: An Overview | Cato at Liberty Blog · cato.org
Remedies for a Constitutional Crisis · chicagounbound.uchicago.edu
[PDF] Taking Appropriations Seriously - Constitutional Governance · constitutional-governance.law.columbia.edu
Democratic backsliding - Wikipedia · en.wikipedia.org
Read transcript

Hope Sterling: Okay, I have been genuinely unsettled since Tuesday — I was reading about federal education grants being frozen and I went down this rabbit hole at like midnight, which, not my best decision, but — there's this number that I cannot shake loose. $410 billion.

Juniper Vale: Starting January 2025.

Hope Sterling: Starting January 2025, the executive branch just... blocked federal agencies from spending it. Money Congress had already — like, legally, formally — approved. And I keep staring at that and going, wait, isn't there supposed to be something that stops this?

Juniper Vale: Three things, actually. The Appropriations Clause — Congress controls what gets spent. The Appointments Clause — the Senate confirms who runs the government. And judicial review — courts can throw out executive actions that break the law. Those are the three structural checks built into the Constitution, and they're permanent on paper.

Hope Sterling: Permanent on paper. That's doing a lot of work in that sentence.

Juniper Vale: Yeah. Because the paradox — the thing that won't let me go — is that Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances, all of it, it's designed so no single branch accumulates unchecked power. The whole architecture is built for exactly this scenario.

Hope Sterling: And yet — $410 billion. So I guess what we're actually trying to figure out today is like, what does it mean that the brake existed and the car still went off the road? Is this about the law being too weak, or is it something weirder, like... the law is fine and something else gave way?

Juniper Vale: Something else gave way. That's the thread we're pulling on today.

Hope Sterling: Wait, but something else gave way — okay what does that even mean though? Like, the brakes are real, they're in the Constitution, but they just... didn't catch?

Juniper Vale: Think of it like a homeowners association with three keys to the building. Congress holds the checkbook. The Senate holds the hiring veto. The courts hold the rulebook. The president can propose anything — but they need all three doors unlocked to actually act.

Hope Sterling: Oh. OH. That's — yeah, that actually lands. So the president isn't just blocked by a rule, they're blocked by like, three separate people who each have to cooperate.

Juniper Vale: Exactly. And each key has a name. The Appropriations Clause — Article I, Section 9 — says literally no money leaves the Treasury without Congress passing a law for it. The Appointments Clause, Article II, means the Senate has to confirm the people who actually run things. Federal judges, cabinet secretaries. And judicial review, codified through the Administrative Procedure Act, means courts can throw out an executive action after the fact if it breaks the law.

Hope Sterling: So it's like — before, during, after. That's the whole lifecycle.

Juniper Vale: That's actually the part that matters. Appropriations starve unauthorized action before it starts. Confirmation controls who's even executing the policy. And then judicial review invalidates things after the fact. They're meant to cover every phase.

Hope Sterling: Okay but wait — if all three of those are real and constitutional and have been there forever, then what actually failed in January? Like, Lucia v. SEC in 2018 said the Appointments Clause is the exclusive way to get federal officers in place. That's not vague! That's the Supreme Court.

Juniper Vale: And that's — I mean, that's the complication. None of these mechanisms operate automatically. Someone has to actually use them. Congress has to move. The Senate has to hold. Courts have to be asked, and then someone has to comply with what they say.

Hope Sterling: So the HOA has three keys and nobody's actually going to the door.

Juniper Vale: Right — but the part nobody's holding is actually why the door exists in the first place. The Appropriations Clause isn't ambiguous. Article I, Section 9: no money leaves the Treasury without a law. That's not a guideline. That's — I mean, it's about as clear as constitutional text gets.

Hope Sterling: Which is why the $410 billion thing is making me spiral! Like, the text is right there — and yet somehow in January 2025 the executive branch is just... freezing appropriated funds? How does that — wait, has this actually happened before?

Juniper Vale: Nixon. Broadly. He impounded funds — just declined to spend money Congress had passed — and Congress came back in 1974 with the Impoundment Control Act specifically to shut that down. Formal procedures, sharp restrictions on the president refusing to spend.

Hope Sterling: So they passed an entire law to fix this exact problem fifty years ago and we're still — stop.

Juniper Vale: Still here. And Zachary Price wrote in the Stanford Law Review that what he calls 'appropriations presidentialism' — this claim that the executive has some inherent preclusive authority over spending — is historically inaccurate. Like, not just legally wrong. The history doesn't support it either.

Hope Sterling: Okay but I need to make this feel real for a second — like, imagine a county administrator, rural county, January 2025, waiting on a federal infrastructure disbursement. The appropriation passed, the law's clear, the money was allocated. And the check just... doesn't come. The account is frozen. That person has no — what do they even do?

Juniper Vale: They litigate. Which takes months. And meanwhile the project stalls, the contractor walks, the — yeah. Congress can also act, but short of a supermajority or a court order, there's actually no fast enforcement mechanism. The brake exists. Nobody can make the car stop quickly.

Hope Sterling: And — oh, this is the part that I think gets so much darker — it's not even that the law is broken. The Impoundment Control Act is still on the books. The Appropriations Clause is still in the Constitution. Everything is technically fine.

Juniper Vale: Which is actually the thing I want to get to — because what happens when no law changes, nothing formally breaks, and the machinery just quietly stops running? That's the layer under this one, and it is genuinely worse.

Hope Sterling: Wait, that's — that's actually the scariest part? Like nothing has to break?

Juniper Vale: Nothing has to break. That's norm erosion — it's a technical term, and it means the informal, unwritten expectations that historically kept branches from pushing their formal powers to the limit just... quietly stop holding. No law changes. The Impoundment Control Act is still on the books. The Appointments Clause is still Article II. But the restraint that made those things work was never in the text.

Hope Sterling: Okay but I need the Senate confirmation version of this — like, NOTUS went through the actual voting patterns and it's basically universal party-line votes on nominees now? That's not — I mean, that used to not be that.

Juniper Vale: And the filibuster for nominees is already gone — they eliminated it. So when the same party controls the White House and the Senate, a simple majority confirms anyone. The Appointments Clause becomes, I mean — it's still there, it's just a formality at that point.

Hope Sterling: A rubber stamp. A very official, constitutional rubber stamp.

Juniper Vale: Which — NOTUS also found that reduced legislative output tracks with that alignment. A Congress running in lockstep with the executive produces fewer chances to actually exercise independent oversight. Less debate, less friction, less check.

Hope Sterling: So the Recess Appointments Clause is also sitting there — like, if the Senate IS pushing back, the president can just wait for a recess and appoint someone temporarily anyway? That's been litigated and it's still a live option?

Juniper Vale: Still contested, yeah. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3. Another pressure valve. And then you get to courts — Baude, Bray, and Levy looked specifically at what courts can actually do during a constitutional crisis. Their finding is blunt: courts can order compliance, but they have no independent enforcement mechanism if the executive just... resists.

Hope Sterling: So the 'oh THAT's why' moment is — all three mechanisms need someone to actually invoke them, and if the political incentives say don't, they all go quiet simultaneously. Not broken. Just idle.

Juniper Vale: The machinery is intact. It just requires political will to run. And that's the part that was never written down anywhere.

Hope Sterling: If you had to bet — like, genuinely put money on it — which one actually holds in a real confrontation? The purse, the confirmation veto, the courts? Because I keep going back and forth and I cannot land anywhere.

Juniper Vale: I keep turning over this image — the Appropriations Clause, sitting in the Constitution for two hundred and thirty-five years, perfectly intact, completely unambiguous, and in January 2025 there's $410 billion just... frozen. The mechanism was right there. And I mean — Congress could have moved. The Senate could have held. Nobody picked it up.

Hope Sterling: That's — god, that's what gets me. Not that the brake failed, exactly. That nobody reached for it.

Juniper Vale: All three mechanisms require Congress and the courts to actively choose to invoke them. That's not a flaw someone forgot to fix. That's the design. And I don't know what to do with that, honestly.

The structural mechanisms that limit presidential power — and why they sometimes fail · Onpode