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The US has burned through 'virtually all' ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles fighting Iran

August 5, 2026 · 9 min

Tess Hollis & Felix Ortiz

The U.S. burned through virtually all of its ATACMS and PrSM long-range precision missiles during five months of the Iran war, per three sources cited by Reuters on August 4, 2026. CSIS estimates fewer than 278 THAAD interceptors remain globally — draining both offensive strike capacity and the defensive shield.

Reuters reported on August 4, 2026, citing three sources familiar with internal data, that the U.S. Army has used "virtually all" of its Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) during the five-month war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, with joint U.S.-Israeli strikes codenamed Operation Epic Fury.

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About this episode

When Reuters reported on August 4th that the US had used 'virtually all' of its ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles during the Iran war, the phrase did a lot of heavy lifting. Three sources, internal data, five months of Operation Epic Fury — and the best anyone would say publicly was those two words. Nobody printed the actual number. This episode sits with that gap and follows where it leads. The depletion turns out to be wider than two missile systems: according to CSIS data from July 29th, fewer than 827 Patriot interceptors and fewer than 278 THAAD interceptors remain in global inventory, with CNN reporting nearly 80% of THAAD depleted. THAAD is a defensive system — it's what protects forward positions from a counterstrike. The episode works through what it means to be simultaneously low on offense and the shield. It also traces how the drawdown spread. To sustain the Iran campaign, the US reportedly pulled from Pacific theater stocks. The episode asks the obvious question nobody is asking out loud: what were those missiles supposed to be doing? And then there's the political dimension. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs reportedly told Trump directly that stockpiles are dangerously low. The Secretary of Defense called such concerns overstated. The episode argues that contradiction — public, unresolved — may itself be the deterrence problem. Taiwan doesn't need the classified number. It just needs to see whether US leadership agrees on whether a problem exists. Right now, it doesn't.

Frequently asked

Has the US run out of ATACMS and PrSM missiles?

The U.S. Army burned through virtually all of its ATACMS and Precision Strike Missile stockpiles during roughly five months of the Iran war, according to three sources with knowledge of internal data cited by Reuters on August 4, 2026. The exact remaining count has not been publicly disclosed.

How depleted are US THAAD interceptors after the Iran war?

CSIS reported on July 29, 2026 that fewer than 278 THAAD interceptors remained globally, with Pentagon sources telling CNN those figures were close to accurate and senior commanders describing the level as dangerously low. THAAD protects bases and forward positions, making this a defensive — not just offensive — shortfall.

Does the US missile shortage affect deterrence against China over Taiwan?

Defense analysts cited in reporting warn that depleting long-range precision stocks in the Middle East weakens Pacific posture. ATACMS and PrSM each cost over a million dollars per unit and require a three-to-five-year production ramp, making meaningful stockpile recovery structurally incompatible with near-term deterrence signaling over Taiwan.

Why are Hegseth and General Dan Caine contradicting each other on missile readiness?

Secretary Hegseth publicly called readiness concerns 'overstated,' while General Dan Caine reportedly went directly to President Trump to warn stockpiles are dangerously low. Because the actual inventory numbers remain classified and Reuters could only report 'virtually all,' both officials can point to the same data and reach opposite conclusions.

Did US missile shortages start before the Iran war?

Analyst Jennifer Kavanagh published a piece on August 3, 2026 arguing the shortage predates the Iran war, attributing it to years of underinvestment in the defense industrial base. Prior ATACMS transfers to Ukraine since 2022 compounded the problem, leaving the Iran war's Operation Epic Fury drawing down an already-thin stockpile.

Grounded in 9 sources
U.S. has used nearly all its stockpile of long-range missiles in Iran war, sources say · cbsnews.com
U.S. has used nearly all its stockpile of long-range missiles in Iran war, ... · cbsnews.com
US military has used up nearly 80% of key missile interceptors as commanders warn stockpiles ‘dangerously low,’ sources say · cnn.com
US has exhausted ‘virtually all’ long-range missiles in Iran war amid fears of wider conflict | The Independent · independent.co.uk
US has used 'virtually all' of its long-range precision ... · reuters.com
Is the US Running Out of Missiles? What We Know - Newsweek · newsweek.com
US used ‘virtually all’ long-range precision missiles during Iran war, sources say · defensenews.com
The Real Munitions Shortage Transcends the Iran War - Defense Priorities · defensepriorities.org
US weapons stockpiles continue to dwindle with permanent end to Iran war nowhere in sight | News Channel 3-12 · keyt.com
Read transcript

Felix Ortiz: Hey, good to be back — I have to tell you, I was on hold with my landlord yesterday morning, just waiting, and I had the Reuters alert open in the other tab, and I read the phrase 'virtually all' and I actually forgot I was on hold.

Tess Hollis: How long before they hung up on you?

Felix Ortiz: Long enough. August fourth, three sources familiar with internal data — the U.S. Army has burned through virtually all of its ATACMS and PrSM stockpiles. Five months of the Iran war. And my landlord is still waiting.

Tess Hollis: Okay, but what grabbed me wasn't even the number — it's that Reuters declined to print the actual number. Three sources, internal data, and the best they could say is 'virtually all.' Nobody will say if there are fifty left or five hundred.

Felix Ortiz: Right, and that gap — that's where Hegseth and Caine are living, actually. Because Hegseth is out there calling readiness concerns 'overstated,' and General Dan Caine reportedly went directly to Trump and said stockpiles are dangerously low. Like — those are not compatible statements.

Tess Hollis: They're not. And that's the thing I want to stay with for a minute. It's not — it's not that one of them is lying, necessarily. It's that 'virtually all' doesn't have a fixed meaning. So they can both point at the same classified inventory report and reach opposite conclusions about whether we're fine.

Felix Ortiz: Which is — wait, that's actually more unsettling than if one of them was just wrong.

Tess Hollis: Yeah. So what we're really trying to figure out today is: what does 'virtually all' actually mean, who gets to decide, and why won't anyone say the number out loud?

Felix Ortiz: Yeah and — okay, but here's what breaks the clean version of that story. Because everyone's hearing 'ATACMS, PrSM, virtually all' and thinking, right, two systems, one war. But it's not two systems. You know how you keep one fire extinguisher in the kitchen, one in the garage, one in the office? After a big fire you used all three. That's already bad. But then someone tells you we also borrowed the neighbor's extinguishers, and half of those are gone too.

Tess Hollis: The whole house is unprotected.

Felix Ortiz: Right — and that's not a metaphor, that's actually the inventory. ATACMS and PrSM are gone. Half the global Tomahawk supply, used up since February 28th. And then CSIS publishes on July 29th — fewer than 827 Patriot interceptors left, fewer than 278 THAAD interceptors. Pentagon sources told CNN those numbers were close to accurate.

Tess Hollis: Wait — 278 THAAD interceptors, globally?

Felix Ortiz: Globally. CNN reported it August 4th — nearly 80% of THAAD inventory depleted, senior commanders calling it dangerously low. And THAAD isn't a strike weapon, that's the thing — THAAD is Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, it's what protects bases, forward positions. That's not a reach problem, that's a survive-the-counterattack problem.

Tess Hollis: So the depletion isn't just offensive capacity. It's the shield.

Felix Ortiz: Yeah, and — wait, the CENTCOM piece makes this worse actually. Because they didn't just burn through what was in theater. They had to pull from other global theaters, Pacific stocks presumably, to backfill the Middle East during Operation Epic Fury. So the drawdown wasn't contained to one region. It spread.

Tess Hollis: Which is the question nobody's asking out loud — what was sitting in those Pacific stocks supposed to be doing?

Felix Ortiz: Exactly. This isn't one system running low. It's five systems, across two mission types, across multiple theaters. That's a different kind of problem.

Tess Hollis: But that spread — the Pacific drawdown — that's actually where the Hegseth-Caine contradiction gets weird. Because the opacity isn't just operational security. It's what lets both of them be technically right. If Reuters can't print the actual number, Hegseth can say 'overstated' and Caine can walk into Trump's office and say 'dangerously low' and neither one is provably wrong.

Felix Ortiz: Oh — that's — yeah, the ambiguity is load-bearing.

Tess Hollis: It's doing real political work. And then the Ukraine thing complicates it further — ATACMS were flowing to Kyiv since 2022. So when Hegseth says the Iran war readiness concerns are overstated, is he actually disagreeing with Caine about Operation Epic Fury's impact? Or is he just — refusing to account for the prior drawdown?

Felix Ortiz: Right, and I keep getting tangled on this — because those are two different arguments dressed in the same words. Like, yeah, actually no — the Ukraine transfers happened. They mattered. But Jennifer Kavanagh put out a piece on August 3rd, literally the day before the Reuters story, arguing the shortage predates the Iran war entirely. Years of underinvestment in the defense industrial base. So it's not Ukraine, it's not Epic Fury — it's both, on top of a foundation that was already thin.

Tess Hollis: And that's the thing the political system can't hold. It wants one villain — Ukraine policy, or the Iran war decision. The actual answer is two compounding choices on a depleted base.

Felix Ortiz: Which means — wait, who bears responsibility? Because if Kavanagh's right, it's not Trump's Iran call, it's not the Ukraine transfers specifically, it's a decade of procurement decisions nobody wants to own.

Tess Hollis: Okay — picture a CENTCOM logistics officer, March 1st, 2026, day two of Epic Fury. She gets a tasking: pull surface-to-surface missiles from Pacific theater inventory, backfill the Middle East. She knows the exact number she's moving. She executes it. That transaction never enters the political conversation — by August, three sources are briefing Reuters in the dark, and Hegseth is on TV saying fine.

Felix Ortiz: She's still the only person who knows what that trade cost in the Pacific.

Tess Hollis: Exactly. And the rebuild question — ATACMS cost over a million a unit, three to five year production ramp — that's the part I want to get to, because that timeline doesn't fit neatly against what's sitting on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.

Felix Ortiz: Right, and that timeline is — yeah, that's the number that actually stops me. Over a million per unit, ATACMS and PrSM both. Three to five years to ramp production meaningfully. We burned 'virtually all' of both in five months. So the math is just — you can't sprint back from that before the next thing happens.

Tess Hollis: And what's the next thing?

Felix Ortiz: Taiwan. Like, defense analysts are saying explicitly — depleting long-range precision stocks in the Middle East weakens Pacific posture. That's not a metaphor, that's a — wait, actually, it's worse than posture. If China moves on Taiwan in the next 18 months, the rebuild timeline is structurally incompatible with any credible deterrence signal.

Tess Hollis: Structurally incompatible. That's not 'we'd be stretched.' That's 'the signal doesn't exist.'

Felix Ortiz: Right — and here's the two-dimension problem. It's not just that strike capacity is thin. THAAD is 80% depleted. Fewer than 278 interceptors. So if China moves while we're still rebuilding surface-to-surface missiles, we're simultaneously low on offense and the air defense layer that protects the forces doing the striking.

Tess Hollis: You can't deter and you can't absorb the counterstrike.

Felix Ortiz: At the same time. And — okay, but I think the part that doesn't get said is this: Taiwan doesn't need to know the exact depletion percentage. They don't care if it's 80% or 100%. What they're watching is whether U.S. leadership looks unified. And right now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense are publicly contradicting each other about whether a problem exists.

Tess Hollis: So the deterrence failure isn't the inventory number. It's Caine and Hegseth — out loud, to the same audience — disagreeing about whether the number means anything. That's the signal.

Felix Ortiz: And that signal — it's already out. Like, we don't have to wait for a crisis to see if it lands. Taiwan read that. Beijing read that. The Caine-Hegseth contradiction is public record now. The deterrence message is — wait, it's not even ambiguous, it's just contradicted.

Tess Hollis: And the number is still classified. Nobody outside that room knows if 'virtually all' means we have fifty ATACMS left or five hundred. Reuters has three sources and that phrase. That's what the whole conversation is built on.

Felix Ortiz: Your landlord is still on hold.

Tess Hollis: Exactly. That's — yeah. The alert said 'virtually all' and we've been circling it for an hour and we're still exactly there.

The US has burned through 'virtually all' ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles fighting Iran · Onpode