Jonathan Ingles: Hey, good to see you — and before you sit down, a quick test. Guess the dollar's share of SWIFT payments in 2024, after ten years of everyone predicting its decline.
Elena Marsh: Oh, a quiz. Well, if you're asking, it can't be low. Forty percent?
Jonathan Ingles: Forty-eight. And it's up since 2014. Add that the dollar is in almost 90 percent of FX trades, and the funeral looks premature.
Elena Marsh: Mm, so people who say they want out keep walking in each morning. I'd love to know what that feels like from the inside.
Jonathan Ingles: Resignation, probably. Revealed preference: watch what people do, not what they say. Giscard d'Estaing saw this in the 1960s and called it exorbitant privilege.
Elena Marsh: Yes, and the privilege is that the issuer borrows below market cost, correct?
Jonathan Ingles: Correct. Cheap deficits, because the world must hold the stuff. So is it fair, and can anything replace it? I'd rather leave that open for now.
Elena Marsh: Mm, "the world must hold the stuff." But why must it? Nobody passed a law. Picture a garment maker in Vietnam, a Tuesday morning. Buyer in Germany, fabric from China, and the invoice says dollars anyway.
Jonathan Ingles: Neither side is American. Not one party to that deal.
Elena Marsh: Yes. And the treasurer isn't making a statement. She's dodging a currency conversion and an awkward call with her bank. Well, here's the idea in one line: everyone uses the dollar because everyone else does. Like a plug socket. You could build a different socket, but nothing in your house fits it.
Jonathan Ingles: So switching alone costs you and gains you nothing.
Elena Marsh: Exactly that. Oh, and it's odd, because for her it's cheap to stay. For the whole system it's enormous to leave. Network effects: lower switching cost for any one actor, higher for everyone together. And no one in that office feels coerced.
Jonathan Ingles: Look, that's the surface answer, and it's true. But it isn't the whole story. Plugs don't need a reason to exist. The dollar had one. Bretton Woods, after the war: the dollar pegged to gold, and the IMF and World Bank built around it. Then in 1971 Nixon cut the gold link. The anchor is gone.
Elena Marsh: And the socket kept working?
Jonathan Ingles: Deepened, frankly. Petrodollar arrangements, plus U.S. capital markets deep enough to park trillions in. The demand covers trade invoicing, FX trades, central bank reserves, and it doesn't depend on U.S. fundamentals. Not gold, not good behavior. That's the privilege Giscard was complaining about.
Elena Marsh: Mm, so if the demand doesn't care about U.S. behavior, what does the issuer actually pocket? What's the privilege paid in, practically?
Jonathan Ingles: Seigniorage. The U.S. issues dollar liabilities, and foreigners willingly hold them. So America consumes more than it produces, and the bill gets paid in paper the world wants. Pan Gongsheng, the People's Bank of China governor, put it bluntly: the reserve issuer sustains deficit spending cheaply by exporting currency through current account deficits.
Elena Marsh: Exporting currency. Hm.
Jonathan Ingles: Right, and the quote matters because of who said it. A Chinese central banker describing the mechanism precisely. That's not a complaint. That's a diagnosis.
Elena Marsh: Well, but there's a catch inside it, isn't there? Triffin, in the sixties. To give the world enough reserves, you have to run deficits, persistently. And persistent deficits wear down the confidence that made people want the reserves. So the privilege carries its own expiry date. Yes? Which is where I get stuck. Where does it actually bind?
Jonathan Ingles: Frankly, nobody knows. I've read the pile. Krishnamurthy at Stanford GSB says investors are starting to put less value on the dollar's traditional status. Others say dominance holds. Neither names the line.
Elena Marsh: So 'unsustainable' since Giscard, and still here.
Jonathan Ingles: Sixty years of early warnings. Maybe right, maybe just early. And the sanctions part cuts against both camps, but that's the piece I'd save for next.
Elena Marsh: Oh, then let me bring the sterling story, because it's the one that unsettles me. The dollar passed sterling in global reserves in the mid-1920s. Twenty years before Bretton Woods. And Britain was still treated as the center until Suez, 1956.
Jonathan Ingles: Hold on. Thirty years of acting out a role that had already moved?
Elena Marsh: Mm. The handover was slow. It needed trust, and capital markets deep enough to hold the weight. Everyone kept performing the old arrangement until a crisis made it undeniable. So are we in that gap now? And how would anyone know, from inside it?
Jonathan Ingles: You wouldn't. That's the uncomfortable answer. Krishnamurthy's finding fits, though: doubt can coexist with staying. Look, the Mumbai treasurer can doubt the dollar all morning and still clear in it by noon.
Elena Marsh: But that's the part I can't square. Nobody in Vietnam felt coerced. So where does the Mumbai treasurer's doubt come from, if it isn't coercion? Walk me through her Tuesday.
Jonathan Ingles: She's a compliance officer, actually. Mid-sized Mumbai bank, nine a.m. A payment for discounted crude is settling in dollars, routing through New York. A screening alert fires. Then her correspondent bank's risk desk calls.
Elena Marsh: And she's thinking about Moscow? Washington?
Jonathan Ingles: No. She's thinking about her dollar clearing line. Lose it and the bank's whole import-finance business shuts. So she settles in dirhams, takes the haircut, writes a memo. That's how empire works now. A memo.
Elena Marsh: Mm. So is that power, or is it calculation? Because she's calculating. Nobody forced the dirhams. She weighed it and chose.
Jonathan Ingles: Weighed it against a penalty only one country can impose. Cutting SWIFT and correspondent access is unilateral and asymmetric. Look, calling that a network effect sanitizes it. The choice is rational because the threat is credible.
Elena Marsh: Oh. So the calculation is the coercion, working quietly.
Jonathan Ingles: And 2022 is why every reserve manager now runs that same calculation. Roughly $300 billion of Russian central bank reserves frozen. Everyone files it under sanctions. It's an asset-safety story. Riyadh, Delhi, they read it as: my balance sheet has a landlord.
Elena Marsh: Well, then why don't they leave? If the freeze frightens them, the renminbi should be the obvious door.
Jonathan Ingles: Because the door is locked from the inside. PIIE points to capital controls, limited transparency, shallow bond markets. You can't park reserves where you can't get them out. And the euro lacks unified fiscal backing.
Elena Marsh: And Liao, Prasad and Zhang, 2026, call both a fragmented second tier. No clear rival.
Jonathan Ingles: Right, and BRICS has produced local-currency bilateral deals, gradual ones, but communiqués, not clearing infrastructure. Here's the hard bit. The freeze makes people want out. It also makes out more expensive, because the only exits are thin. Lock-in up now, legitimacy down later. Both true.
Elena Marsh: Hm. Then is the trust affection or resignation? Because the forecast changes depending on which.
Jonathan Ingles: Resignation. I'd bet on it. Affection would show up as people buying dollars they didn't need to, and they don't. They buy what the plumbing forces them to.
Elena Marsh: Mm. Resignation can last a very long time, though. Bordo and Wilkins, 2026, list five foundations for money that scales. Credible convertibility. High-quality, transparent backing. One regulatory perimeter. Par clearing. And credible crisis management. Well, that last one is the dollar's real asset, I think. Nobody has built all five in a hurry.
Jonathan Ingles: Which is why a quick fix doesn't exist. Look, what about mBridge and stablecoins? Those are the new rails.
Elena Marsh: Here's the irony. The BIS Project mBridge may cut the frictions, and stablecoins too. But they're likely anchored to dollar-denominated assets. So the new rails could deepen the network effect.
Jonathan Ingles: The exit gets built out of the thing you're exiting.
Elena Marsh: Oh. Yes, that's it.
Jonathan Ingles: So here's what I'd watch. Not the communiqués. Whether new rails, or more sanctions, change what staying costs the largest dollar holders. The Riyadh and Delhi reserve managers. Small holders can't move the number. Those can.
Elena Marsh: And if staying gets expensive, resignation turns into something else. If it's affection, it never does. Hm. I still don't know which one it is.
Jonathan Ingles: Neither do they, frankly. Probably why nobody's moved.
Elena Marsh: Mm. Well, thank you for the Mumbai memo. I'll be thinking about her Tuesday for a while.