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Why controlling the world's reserve currency gives one nation outsized monetary power

November 22, 2026 · 9 min

Jonathan Ingles & Elena Marsh

The U.S. dollar made up 48% of SWIFT payments in 2024 — up since 2014 — and appears in nearly 90% of FX trades, sustaining a network effect where rivals like the renminbi face capital controls and shallow bond markets. No rival has yet built all five foundations for reserve-scale money.

The U.S. dollar functions as the world's primary reserve currency and international medium of exchange, a role formalized through the Bretton Woods system established after World War II and maintained after the dollar's decoupling from gold in 1971.

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About this episode

The dollar's share of global SWIFT payments rose between 2014 and 2024, landing at 48%. That number sits awkwardly against a decade of confident predictions about de-dollarization. This episode tries to explain the gap — not by dismissing the critics, but by taking the mechanics seriously. It starts with network effects: the dollar persists because switching alone costs any one actor and gains them nothing, like a plug socket where nothing in your house fits the alternative. But it doesn't stop there. When a compliance officer at a Mumbai bank routes a payment through New York and trips a sanctions screen, she isn't thinking about geopolitics. She's protecting her dollar clearing line. Lose it and the bank's import-finance business shuts. The calculation is rational. The threat behind it is unilateral. The episode works through Triffin's dilemma — the idea that the reserve issuer must run persistent deficits to supply the world with reserves, and that those deficits eventually undermine the confidence that made the reserves valuable. It's been 'unsustainable' since the 1960s and counting. It draws on the sterling precedent, where the actual transfer of reserve status took thirty years to become undeniable. And it looks honestly at why the obvious alternatives — renminbi, euro, BRICS settlement — haven't cleared the bar yet. The question it leaves open is the right one: is the dollar system held together by affection or by resignation? The answer, it turns out, determines everything about what comes next.

Frequently asked

Why does the US dollar dominate global trade even when neither buyer nor seller is American?

Dollar dominance in global trade persists because of network effects: a Vietnamese garment maker invoicing a German buyer in dollars avoids currency conversion costs and banking friction. No individual actor gains by switching alone, so the dollar remains the invoice currency even in transactions with no American party.

What is exorbitant privilege in economics?

Exorbitant privilege, a phrase Giscard d'Estaing applied in the 1960s, describes the United States' ability to borrow below market cost because global demand for dollars means the world willingly holds U.S. liabilities. This lets America run persistent deficits financed, in effect, by exporting currency the world wants to hold.

How did the 2022 freezing of Russian central bank reserves affect dollar trust?

The 2022 freezing of roughly $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves signaled to reserve managers in Riyadh and Delhi that dollar-denominated assets have a de facto landlord. The episode accelerated interest in alternatives while simultaneously making alternatives more expensive, since the only exit options — renminbi, euro — remain thin or restricted.

Why can't the renminbi or euro replace the dollar as the global reserve currency?

The renminbi cannot absorb reserve flows because China maintains capital controls, limited transparency, and shallow bond markets — reserves parked there cannot be reliably retrieved. The euro lacks unified fiscal backing. Liao, Prasad, and Zhang (2026) describe both as a fragmented second tier with no clear rival to dollar infrastructure.

Could stablecoins or projects like mBridge end dollar dominance?

Stablecoins and BIS Project mBridge could reduce transaction friction, but most stablecoins are anchored to dollar-denominated assets. New payment rails built on dollar-backed instruments are likely to deepen rather than displace the dollar network effect — meaning the infrastructure designed as an exit may reinforce the system being exited.

Grounded in 11 sources
The Bretton Woods Experience and ERM ↗ · arxiv.org
Rising China: Global Challenges (China Update) ↗ · doi.org
Money and Power: Historical Lessons for Stablecoins and U.S. Dollar Dominance ↗ · doi.org
Financial Innovation and the International Monetary System ↗ · doi.org
The Dollar’s Dominance Is Eroding | Stanford Graduate School of Business ↗ · gsb.stanford.edu
Challenges to the US Dollar's Dominance as the Global Reserve Currency: Geopolitical, Economic, and Fiscal Perspectives by Umar Butt :: SSRN ↗ · papers.ssrn.com
The Dollar: The World’s Reserve Currency | Council on Foreign Relations ↗ · cfr.org
Geopolitical fragmentation risks and international currencies ↗ · ecb.europa.eu
Dedollarization: Causes, Constraints, and Consequences | AIER ↗ · aier.org
De-dollarisation in BRICS: Strategic Ambition or Practical Gradualism? ↗ · bricscouncil.ru
Global Institute presentation: Steve Kamin on the dollar’s status - Dallasfed.org ↗ · dallasfed.org
Read transcript

Jonathan Ingles: Hey, good to see you — and before you sit down, a quick test. Guess the dollar's share of SWIFT payments in 2024, after ten years of everyone predicting its decline.

Elena Marsh: Oh, a quiz. Well, if you're asking, it can't be low. Forty percent?

Jonathan Ingles: Forty-eight. And it's up since 2014. Add that the dollar is in almost 90 percent of FX trades, and the funeral looks premature.

Elena Marsh: Mm, so people who say they want out keep walking in each morning. I'd love to know what that feels like from the inside.

Jonathan Ingles: Resignation, probably. Revealed preference: watch what people do, not what they say. Giscard d'Estaing saw this in the 1960s and called it exorbitant privilege.

Elena Marsh: Yes, and the privilege is that the issuer borrows below market cost, correct?

Jonathan Ingles: Correct. Cheap deficits, because the world must hold the stuff. So is it fair, and can anything replace it? I'd rather leave that open for now.

Elena Marsh: Mm, "the world must hold the stuff." But why must it? Nobody passed a law. Picture a garment maker in Vietnam, a Tuesday morning. Buyer in Germany, fabric from China, and the invoice says dollars anyway.

Jonathan Ingles: Neither side is American. Not one party to that deal.

Elena Marsh: Yes. And the treasurer isn't making a statement. She's dodging a currency conversion and an awkward call with her bank. Well, here's the idea in one line: everyone uses the dollar because everyone else does. Like a plug socket. You could build a different socket, but nothing in your house fits it.

Jonathan Ingles: So switching alone costs you and gains you nothing.

Elena Marsh: Exactly that. Oh, and it's odd, because for her it's cheap to stay. For the whole system it's enormous to leave. Network effects: lower switching cost for any one actor, higher for everyone together. And no one in that office feels coerced.

Jonathan Ingles: Look, that's the surface answer, and it's true. But it isn't the whole story. Plugs don't need a reason to exist. The dollar had one. Bretton Woods, after the war: the dollar pegged to gold, and the IMF and World Bank built around it. Then in 1971 Nixon cut the gold link. The anchor is gone.

Elena Marsh: And the socket kept working?

Jonathan Ingles: Deepened, frankly. Petrodollar arrangements, plus U.S. capital markets deep enough to park trillions in. The demand covers trade invoicing, FX trades, central bank reserves, and it doesn't depend on U.S. fundamentals. Not gold, not good behavior. That's the privilege Giscard was complaining about.

Elena Marsh: Mm, so if the demand doesn't care about U.S. behavior, what does the issuer actually pocket? What's the privilege paid in, practically?

Jonathan Ingles: Seigniorage. The U.S. issues dollar liabilities, and foreigners willingly hold them. So America consumes more than it produces, and the bill gets paid in paper the world wants. Pan Gongsheng, the People's Bank of China governor, put it bluntly: the reserve issuer sustains deficit spending cheaply by exporting currency through current account deficits.

Elena Marsh: Exporting currency. Hm.

Jonathan Ingles: Right, and the quote matters because of who said it. A Chinese central banker describing the mechanism precisely. That's not a complaint. That's a diagnosis.

Elena Marsh: Well, but there's a catch inside it, isn't there? Triffin, in the sixties. To give the world enough reserves, you have to run deficits, persistently. And persistent deficits wear down the confidence that made people want the reserves. So the privilege carries its own expiry date. Yes? Which is where I get stuck. Where does it actually bind?

Jonathan Ingles: Frankly, nobody knows. I've read the pile. Krishnamurthy at Stanford GSB says investors are starting to put less value on the dollar's traditional status. Others say dominance holds. Neither names the line.

Elena Marsh: So 'unsustainable' since Giscard, and still here.

Jonathan Ingles: Sixty years of early warnings. Maybe right, maybe just early. And the sanctions part cuts against both camps, but that's the piece I'd save for next.

Elena Marsh: Oh, then let me bring the sterling story, because it's the one that unsettles me. The dollar passed sterling in global reserves in the mid-1920s. Twenty years before Bretton Woods. And Britain was still treated as the center until Suez, 1956.

Jonathan Ingles: Hold on. Thirty years of acting out a role that had already moved?

Elena Marsh: Mm. The handover was slow. It needed trust, and capital markets deep enough to hold the weight. Everyone kept performing the old arrangement until a crisis made it undeniable. So are we in that gap now? And how would anyone know, from inside it?

Jonathan Ingles: You wouldn't. That's the uncomfortable answer. Krishnamurthy's finding fits, though: doubt can coexist with staying. Look, the Mumbai treasurer can doubt the dollar all morning and still clear in it by noon.

Elena Marsh: But that's the part I can't square. Nobody in Vietnam felt coerced. So where does the Mumbai treasurer's doubt come from, if it isn't coercion? Walk me through her Tuesday.

Jonathan Ingles: She's a compliance officer, actually. Mid-sized Mumbai bank, nine a.m. A payment for discounted crude is settling in dollars, routing through New York. A screening alert fires. Then her correspondent bank's risk desk calls.

Elena Marsh: And she's thinking about Moscow? Washington?

Jonathan Ingles: No. She's thinking about her dollar clearing line. Lose it and the bank's whole import-finance business shuts. So she settles in dirhams, takes the haircut, writes a memo. That's how empire works now. A memo.

Elena Marsh: Mm. So is that power, or is it calculation? Because she's calculating. Nobody forced the dirhams. She weighed it and chose.

Jonathan Ingles: Weighed it against a penalty only one country can impose. Cutting SWIFT and correspondent access is unilateral and asymmetric. Look, calling that a network effect sanitizes it. The choice is rational because the threat is credible.

Elena Marsh: Oh. So the calculation is the coercion, working quietly.

Jonathan Ingles: And 2022 is why every reserve manager now runs that same calculation. Roughly $300 billion of Russian central bank reserves frozen. Everyone files it under sanctions. It's an asset-safety story. Riyadh, Delhi, they read it as: my balance sheet has a landlord.

Elena Marsh: Well, then why don't they leave? If the freeze frightens them, the renminbi should be the obvious door.

Jonathan Ingles: Because the door is locked from the inside. PIIE points to capital controls, limited transparency, shallow bond markets. You can't park reserves where you can't get them out. And the euro lacks unified fiscal backing.

Elena Marsh: And Liao, Prasad and Zhang, 2026, call both a fragmented second tier. No clear rival.

Jonathan Ingles: Right, and BRICS has produced local-currency bilateral deals, gradual ones, but communiqués, not clearing infrastructure. Here's the hard bit. The freeze makes people want out. It also makes out more expensive, because the only exits are thin. Lock-in up now, legitimacy down later. Both true.

Elena Marsh: Hm. Then is the trust affection or resignation? Because the forecast changes depending on which.

Jonathan Ingles: Resignation. I'd bet on it. Affection would show up as people buying dollars they didn't need to, and they don't. They buy what the plumbing forces them to.

Elena Marsh: Mm. Resignation can last a very long time, though. Bordo and Wilkins, 2026, list five foundations for money that scales. Credible convertibility. High-quality, transparent backing. One regulatory perimeter. Par clearing. And credible crisis management. Well, that last one is the dollar's real asset, I think. Nobody has built all five in a hurry.

Jonathan Ingles: Which is why a quick fix doesn't exist. Look, what about mBridge and stablecoins? Those are the new rails.

Elena Marsh: Here's the irony. The BIS Project mBridge may cut the frictions, and stablecoins too. But they're likely anchored to dollar-denominated assets. So the new rails could deepen the network effect.

Jonathan Ingles: The exit gets built out of the thing you're exiting.

Elena Marsh: Oh. Yes, that's it.

Jonathan Ingles: So here's what I'd watch. Not the communiqués. Whether new rails, or more sanctions, change what staying costs the largest dollar holders. The Riyadh and Delhi reserve managers. Small holders can't move the number. Those can.

Elena Marsh: And if staying gets expensive, resignation turns into something else. If it's affection, it never does. Hm. I still don't know which one it is.

Jonathan Ingles: Neither do they, frankly. Probably why nobody's moved.

Elena Marsh: Mm. Well, thank you for the Mumbai memo. I'll be thinking about her Tuesday for a while.