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Cover art for Why deepening trade ties weaken the ability to act unilaterally

Why deepening trade ties weaken the ability to act unilaterally

November 19, 2026 · 14 min

Tess Hollis & Felix Ortiz

Tess, hey — okay, I have to ask, did you sleep this week or were you also just doom-reading about sanctions regimes? Honestly, I got deep into this Iran data at like eleven at night and then just couldn't put it down. Yeah, same — same, actually. Because the numbers are just sitting there being…

Nations that integrate deeply into global supply chains, financial systems, and trade networks gain measurable efficiency benefits — specialization, lower input costs, access to foreign capital and technology, and larger consumer markets. However, this integration creates structural dependencies that can be exploited by powerful actors controlling critical network nodes.

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About this episode

Nations that integrate deeply into global supply chains, financial systems, and trade networks gain measurable efficiency benefits — specialization, lower input costs, access to foreign capital and technology, and larger consumer markets. However, this integration creates structural dependencies that can be exploited by powerful actors controlling critical network nodes.

Grounded in 9 sources
The Effectiveness of Sanctions as a Tool of Coercive Diplomacy: an Analysis of the Islamic Republic of Iran Case (1979–2025) ↗ · doi.org
Food Sovereignty in an Age of Geopolitical Fragmentation: Corporate Power, Global Supply-Chain Vulnerabilities, and the Reconfiguration of Indonesia’s National Food Politics ↗ · doi.org
Can de-risking avert supply chain precarity in the face of China-U.S. geopolitical tensions? From sanctions to semiconductor resilience and national security ↗ · doi.org
The Rise of Geoeconomic Competition: The Strategic Centrality of Economic Instruments in Global Power Politics and Foreign Policy ↗ · doi.org
Friendshoring: How Geopolitical Tensions Are Reshaping Global Supply Chains ↗ · doi.org
Weaponized Interdependence Theory in International Relations ↗ · medium.com
Sovereignty in a globalised world | Bank for International Settlements ↗ · bis.org
autarky ↗ · britannica.com
How the Drive for Autarchy Caused WWII ↗ · chinatalk.media
Read transcript

Felix Ortiz: Tess, hey — okay, I have to ask, did you sleep this week or were you also just doom-reading about sanctions regimes?

Tess Hollis: Honestly, I got deep into this Iran data at like eleven at night and then just couldn't put it down.

Felix Ortiz: Yeah, same — same, actually. Because the numbers are just sitting there being uncomfortable.

Tess Hollis: That's exactly the thing we're here to pull apart today — economic coercion, what it actually does, what it doesn't.

Tess Hollis: So — Iran. 2012 to 2015. The United States and Western partners exclude Iran from SWIFT, from dollar-clearing entirely. Oil exports drop sixty percent. GDP contracts twelve point four percent. The currency loses roughly half its value within months of the SWIFT exclusion.

Felix Ortiz: That's not a pressure campaign, that's — wait, that's closer to a demolition.

Tess Hollis: It is. And then nothing changed. By May 2025, Iran's uranium stockpile had reached 408.6 kilograms at sixty percent enrichment. That's — the strategic defiance just continued across the whole arc, 1979 to now.

Felix Ortiz: So the lever worked perfectly... on the wrong thing.

Tess Hollis: That's the question, right. The coercion hit the economy exactly as designed — weaponized interdependence working as advertised. The behavior it was supposed to change? Completely unmoved.

Felix Ortiz: Which means — okay, I need to sit with this — are we asking whether interdependence creates leverage? Because yeah, obviously it does. Or are we asking whether that leverage actually moves the thing the coercer wants moved?

Tess Hollis: The second one. That's what we're here to figure out. The most powerful economic tool in the world keeps winning battles and losing campaigns — and nobody's really naming why.

Felix Ortiz: And that's — okay, that's the thing that made me want to back up all the way. Because before we even get to why the lever fails, there's a more basic question. Why does anyone reach for the lever in the first place? Like, what's the actual deal they're accepting when they plug into these global networks?

Tess Hollis: What do you mean, what deal?

Felix Ortiz: Think about it like this. You can grow all your own food in your backyard. Expensive, inefficient, nobody can cut you off. Or you buy from the best suppliers worldwide — cheap, great quality, but if one supplier decides they don't like you, your kitchen goes empty. That's the whole trade-off in two sentences.

Tess Hollis: Okay, that's clean. So integration buys you efficiency. Autarky buys you — what, insulation?

Felix Ortiz: Right, but — and this is what I keep tripping on — the backyard option isn't free either. Autarky is genuinely unattractive. High costs, inefficiency, and historically it doesn't just stay economic. It tends to pull political systems somewhere darker. WWII-era examples, isolationist spirals. It's not a clean safe harbor.

Tess Hollis: So both poles carry permanent costs. That's the actual structure.

Felix Ortiz: Both poles carry permanent costs. Yeah. You're not picking between a good option and a bad option — you're picking which kind of pain you're willing to live with.

Tess Hollis: Indonesia is literally inside this right now. The food sovereignty debate. They're trying to decide how much to depend on global food imports versus building domestic production capacity — and the research just flatly says neither choice resolves the structural vulnerability. The tension persists regardless of which door they pick.

Felix Ortiz: Wait — neither one resolves it?

Tess Hollis: Neither one. Because food sovereignty — controlling your own production independently of corporate or geopolitical pressure — sounds like it closes the vulnerability. But full import liberalization leaves you exposed to exactly the supplier-cuts-you-off problem you just described. And autarky in agriculture is ruinously expensive. Indonesia is stuck in the same bind, just with rice instead of semiconductors.

Felix Ortiz: So the two doors framing is — actually, no, that's the trap itself, isn't it. We keep acting like there's a solution hiding behind one of the doors. But structurally, the tension doesn't get solved. It just gets... managed differently.

Tess Hollis: And that's what makes the Iran case so strange to look at. Because you'd think — sixty percent reduction in oil exports, twelve point four percent GDP contraction — you'd think that level of pain would force a resolution. Force a choice. But instead it just demonstrated that even catastrophic pressure doesn't collapse the dilemma. It just surfaces which costs a state is more willing to absorb.

Felix Ortiz: Right, and — okay, that surfaces something, because the pain isn't random. It doesn't land everywhere equally. It flows through specific nodes. And whoever controls the node controls the pain.

Tess Hollis: That's the chokepoint. That's the actual mechanism.

Felix Ortiz: Yeah — so picture this. South Korean semiconductor executive, mid-2024, sitting in a hotel room in Taipei on a video call with her supply chain team in Seoul. She's looking at a dependency map of her advanced chip production. And she realizes — wait, no, she already knew — the whole thing runs through a network that the U.S. and China are actively fighting over. She's not in a war. But she's navigating one.

Tess Hollis: And she didn't choose that. She just optimized — integrated into the Global Semiconductor Value Chain because it was the efficient thing to do.

Felix Ortiz: Exactly — and now the U.S. has weaponized that position. Export controls, industrial policy, the whole toolkit aimed at China through the GSVC. That's not trade policy anymore. That's geoeconomics. The boundary between economics and security just... dissolved.

Tess Hollis: Okay, but the same logic ran through SWIFT first. Dollar clearing is the earlier version of this same move.

Felix Ortiz: Oh — yeah. Because the U.S. doesn't need to fire anything. Dollar hegemony means U.S. jurisdiction over the financial institutions that clear basically everything. You exclude someone from SWIFT, from dollar clearing, and you've functionally exiled them from the global economy. Iran, 2012. That sixty percent oil export collapse — that's what exile looks like in practice.

Tess Hollis: So the same structural logic shows up twice — once in finance, once in chips. Control the node, and every dependent has to route through you.

Felix Ortiz: Which is — wait, actually that's what makes the semiconductor case feel different to me. With SWIFT, the node was kind of invisible until it wasn't. Most people didn't know SWIFT existed until Iran got cut off. But the chip controls on China? The U.S. announced them. Loudly. Repeatedly.

Tess Hollis: And that's your surprise back at you — the leverage got so visible, deployed so many times, that you essentially trained your targets to build redundancy. China accelerated its domestic chip push specifically because the chokepoint was now legible.

Felix Ortiz: Oh — that's a genuinely uncomfortable inversion. We made the weapon obvious, so the target started building the counter.

Tess Hollis: Iran built Petro-Yuan clearing with China. Russia deepened the same infrastructure after 2022. The visibility of the chokepoint is what triggered the workaround architecture.

Felix Ortiz: And that's — okay, we should sit with what that means for whether the coercion is actually failing or just... succeeding at something other than what it claims to be doing. That's the layer I want to get into next.

Tess Hollis: But that's the part that breaks the clean version — because the coercion did escalate. The Iran sanctions didn't stay at 2012 levels. They got more severe. And the uranium stockpile climbed anyway. 408.6 kilograms at sixty percent enrichment by May 2025. That's not defiance despite the pressure. That's defiance through the pressure.

Felix Ortiz: Through it. Yeah — that word matters.

Tess Hollis: So what does escalating coercion that escalates the target's defiance actually mean for the coercion model?

Felix Ortiz: Okay — right, and I keep wanting to say it proves sanctions fail, but wait, actually — no, that's too simple. Because the economic devastation was real. The Russia-Iran bilateral trade hitting fifteen billion dollars, the alternative payment systems, the Petro-Yuan clearing with China — that didn't happen in a vacuum. That happened because the sanctions pressure forced Iran to build new infrastructure or die. So in a weird way the coercion... created its own counter-architecture.

Tess Hollis: Which is a different failure mode than we usually name.

Felix Ortiz: Right — it's not that the lever slipped. It's that the lever taught the target where the lever was.

Tess Hollis: Okay but — wait. If that's true across two decades with Iran, and Russia ran the same adaptation playbook in roughly two years after 2022, that's a compression of the timeline. The exit infrastructure is getting faster to build because the blueprints already exist.

Felix Ortiz: Oh — the blueprints already exist. Iran literally handed Russia the manual.

Tess Hollis: Third-party circumvention gets more robust exactly as more willing partners accumulate. Each sanctioned state that survives makes the next one harder to isolate.

Felix Ortiz: So then — I mean, if we follow that all the way — who is the sender actually trying to coerce? Because Iran didn't comply. Russia isn't complying. And yet the United States and its allies keep deploying the same mechanism. That's not a mistake being repeated once. That's — I want to say forty-six years of the same non-result with Iran alone since 1979.

Tess Hollis: And that's the reframe that feels almost too uncomfortable to say out loud. If the target doesn't change and you keep doing it — maybe the target was never really the audience.

Felix Ortiz: Allied domestic constituencies. International partners. The sanction as signal, not as lever.

Tess Hollis: Which would mean the entire logic of financial exclusion as behavioral leverage — dollar hegemony, SWIFT exclusion, all of it — might need fundamental revision. Not because it doesn't inflict costs. It clearly does. But because in a multipolar world where Russia, Iran, and China are actively constructing the exit ramps together, the costs no longer reliably produce compliance.

Felix Ortiz: Right — and that's your question back at me. Is this proving coercion doesn't work, or proving it works but takes so long you've already lost the original political goal? Because with Iran, the goal in 2012 was a nuclear deal. By May 2025, the stockpile is 408.6 kilograms. I don't think the question resolves cleanly. I think both things are true simultaneously and that's exactly what makes it so hard to rethink the tool.

Tess Hollis: And that's the thing I keep bumping into with de-risking. Everyone talks about it like it's a solution — move chips from China to Vietnam, shift food supply to a different partner. But the research just says: you relocated the chokepoint. You didn't remove it.

Felix Ortiz: Friendshoring is integration with vetting. The dependency is still there, it's just — it has a different flag on it now.

Tess Hollis: And the AI forewarning piece doesn't change that either. Four to eight weeks of advance warning on a disruption — that's real, that's useful — but knowing something is coming isn't the same as not being structurally dependent on the thing that's about to break.

Felix Ortiz: It's — yeah, it's like getting a weather forecast for a storm when you live in a floodplain. The warning's good. The floodplain's still there.

Tess Hollis: Which is what pulls me to the scarier version of this. If Petro-Yuan clearing matures — if the regional networks that Iran and Russia have been stitching together actually become reliable — then the entire infrastructure of financial exclusion just... loses its teeth. SWIFT exclusion, dollar clearing as a weapon, the thing that produced that sixty percent oil export collapse — all of it depends on there being no credible alternative. And we've spent twenty years handing motivated actors a reason to build one.

Felix Ortiz: And then what? Like — genuinely, what comes after dollar hegemony as the coercive tool? I don't have an answer to that.

Tess Hollis: Neither do I. And I think that's actually the honest place this lands. The autonomy-efficiency trade-off doesn't get solved. Indonesia won't solve it with rice, the U.S. won't solve it with chip policy, nobody solved it by routing around SWIFT. It just gets managed, permanently, with no clean exit.

Felix Ortiz: That's genuinely uncomfortable to sit with. But yeah — I think that's right. It's the condition, not a problem waiting for the right policy.

Tess Hollis: Good conversation. Genuinely — this one stuck with me.