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Why hereditary succession creates different stability problems than electoral systems

November 13, 2026 · 13 min

Iris Holm & Cyrus Reed

Iris, I went down a genuinely uncomfortable rabbit hole this week — uncomfortable because I realized I've had this assumption baked in that I never actually examined. What assumption? That republics are just... structurally better at succession. Like that's settled. But then I kept coming back to the Roman Republic — which didn't fail through…

Monarchies and republics represent fundamentally different institutional solutions to the problem of political succession—the transfer of power from one leader to the next. Hereditary monarchies concentrate succession in a ruling family, creating predictable lines of transition but concentrating enormous risk in individual capability.

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About this episode

Monarchies and republics represent fundamentally different institutional solutions to the problem of political succession—the transfer of power from one leader to the next. Hereditary monarchies concentrate succession in a ruling family, creating predictable lines of transition but concentrating enormous risk in individual capability.

Grounded in 12 sources
Stability Rules: Succession Institutions, Conflict, and Divergent Paths of State Development ↗ · dash.harvard.edu
FROM HUN–TURKIC MILITARY HERITAGE TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE: THE WARRIOR IDENTITY OF THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AGAINST THE MONGOL INVASIONS AND ITS CONTINENTAL HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES (THIRTEENTH CENTURY) ↗ · doi.org
Anticipating Instability: Assessing and Removing Risks Before They Happen ↗ · doi.org
Westminster Regained: the Applicability of the Westminster System for Executive Power in India, Ceylon and New Zealand After Independence ↗ · doi.org
Formulas for Autocratic Stability: A Review Article ↗ · doi.org
Constitutional monarchy and long-run economic growth: friends or foes? ↗ · doi.org
On the overthrow or endurance of kings ↗ · doi.org
2.5 THE VECTORS OF POLITICAL POWER ↗ · doi.org
Leader Succession and Civil War - Andrej Kokkonen, Anders Sundell, 2020 ↗ · journals.sagepub.com
Political Succession: A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics ↗ · journals.sagepub.com
Constitutional monarchy and long-run economic growth: friends or foes? | European Journal of Law and Economics | Springer Nature Link ↗ · link.springer.com
Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies? - Knutsen - 2015 - American Journal of Political Science - Wiley Online Libra ↗ · onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Read transcript

Cyrus Reed: Iris, I went down a genuinely uncomfortable rabbit hole this week — uncomfortable because I realized I've had this assumption baked in that I never actually examined.

Iris Holm: What assumption?

Cyrus Reed: That republics are just... structurally better at succession. Like that's settled. But then I kept coming back to the Roman Republic — which didn't fail through one bad leader, it failed through factionalism and legitimacy collapse and partisan warfare, that's a republic failing in a specifically republican way — and I thought, wait, is that actually better than what a monarchy does when it fails?

Iris Holm: Name the failure mode before you name the system.

Cyrus Reed: Right — and that's it, actually. Because when a medieval English king died without an undisputed heir, the failure mode was decades of civil war. Completely different shape than Rome. So the question isn't which system is safer, it's — how does each one fail, and can you live with that failure mode.

Iris Holm: Differential failure modes. That's the thesis.

Cyrus Reed: And Louis XVI is sitting there as like the canonical example of what happens when hereditary succession hands you someone who cannot do the job — because the hereditary principle gives you clarity, it gives you a name, it cannot give you competence.

Iris Holm: Monarchies concentrate succession risk in a bloodline. Republics distribute it across rules and elections. Each one creates a distinct vulnerability.

Cyrus Reed: Which means — huh — neither one actually solved it. They just moved it around.

Iris Holm: That's what we're here to figure out.

Cyrus Reed: But moved it around in really different shapes, right — because like, okay, think about a family business passed down to whoever was born first. You might get a genius. You might get someone who cannot tie their shoes. And you have zero say. That's the hereditary principle in one sentence.

Iris Holm: And a republic is the company that runs elections for CEO. Cleaner on paper.

Cyrus Reed: Until half the board refuses to accept the result.

Iris Holm: Then you haven't avoided the crisis. You've changed its shape. Frederick the Great is what the hereditary lottery looks like when it goes right — policy continuity, military coherence, decades of it, no election could have locked that in. Charles II of Spain is what it looks like when it goes wrong. Completely incapacitated, ruled for thirty-five years, watched institutional stability that took generations to build just — dissolve.

Cyrus Reed: Wait, thirty-five years?

Iris Holm: Thirty-five. And Louis XVI is the sharper version — because the failure there wasn't just policy drift, it was regime collapse. Not disruption. Collapse.

Cyrus Reed: Okay but — wait, republics also had catastrophic failures. The Roman Republic didn't fall because of one bad consul. It was, I mean, it was factionalism, it was partisan warfare, elite fragmentation — that's a completely different mechanism.

Iris Holm: Exactly the point. Rome's failure mode was procedural, not personal. No single incompetent destroyed it. The rules themselves got contested — who counts as a legitimate faction, whose elections count, whose don't. Once that breaks, you're not fixing a bad king. You're rebuilding consensus from scratch.

Cyrus Reed: So legitimacy collapse is — it corrodes the floor, not just the furniture.

Iris Holm: And it's diffuse. That's the structural difference. Monarchy's failure mode is concentrated — one bad heir, one reign, catastrophic but bounded. The republic's failure mode spreads. Factionalism and leadership churn — you can have procedurally peaceful succession and still get policy whiplash every four years, still get elites who decide the stakes are too high to accept the outcome.

Cyrus Reed: Huh. So the republican version is — wait, is that actually worse? Like, corroding the rules sounds more dangerous than one catastrophically bad king.

Iris Holm: Potentially more destructive, yes. A kingdom survives Charles II. The Roman Republic didn't survive its legitimacy collapse — it became an empire. That's not recovery. That's transformation into something else entirely.

Cyrus Reed: So the question isn't which system fails less — it's which failure you can actually come back from.

Iris Holm: But 'come back from' assumes the system is what breaks. That's the part that doesn't hold.

Cyrus Reed: Wait — what do you mean it's not the system?

Iris Holm: When we say a monarchy failed or a republic held, we're almost always describing the institutions *around* the regime. Not the regime itself. The label is doing almost no work.

Cyrus Reed: Okay but — how does that cash out in an actual case, because that sounds almost too clean.

Iris Holm: India, Ceylon, New Zealand. All three adopted Westminster parliamentary succession rules at independence. Identical blueprint. Same document, same formal structures. A generation later — completely divergent outcomes.

Cyrus Reed: So why? Same blueprint, different — wait, is it just that the soil was different? Like, what was actually underneath the document?

Iris Holm: Courts. Elite norms. Whether the professional administration was actually independent or a patronage network. Machiavelli was already saying this — the quality of surrounding power constraints matters more than the formal label you put on the regime.

Cyrus Reed: So an advisor in Colombo in 1948 holding the exact same constitutional text as her counterpart in Wellington — she's not actually holding the same thing.

Iris Holm: She's holding paper. The institutions that make it real weren't there yet.

Cyrus Reed: That is — huh. That reframes the whole comparison. Because we keep testing monarchy against republic when the actual variable is just... institutional maturity.

Iris Holm: And that's where Béla IV is interesting. Mongol invasion, 13th century — existential external threat. The monarchy didn't survive because hereditary succession worked. It survived because Béla personally rebuilt the administrative and military infrastructure around it. The institution was him, not the hereditary principle.

Cyrus Reed: So external shock just — exposes which institutions were load-bearing all along.

Iris Holm: And the survivorship bias cuts the same way. The constitutional monarchies we're looking at today as proof that monarchy 'works' — they're the ones that didn't collapse. We're not counting the ones that failed catastrophically. Prosperity sustained those monarchies; those monarchies didn't produce prosperity.

Cyrus Reed: And the part that makes all of this worse — we haven't even touched what actually holds any of these systems together when the institutions aren't enough. That's coming, and I think it breaks the whole frame we just built.

Iris Holm: And that frame — institutions doing the work, not the regime label — is exactly where Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith get strange. Because their finding is that the institutions themselves are held together by something you can't put in a document.

Cyrus Reed: What — what do you mean can't put in a document?

Iris Holm: Non-events. The crises that never arrived. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's argument is that the coups that didn't happen, the succession contests that never materialized — those reshape governance more than actual instability does.

Cyrus Reed: Hold on. You're saying stability is built out of things that — wait, that didn't happen?

Iris Holm: Leaders preemptively buy off the general who might have revolted. Reform the succession rule that might have been contested. Accommodate the faction that might have defected. The crisis never arrives because the system bent to prevent it. No one records a non-event.

Cyrus Reed: So the whole equilibrium is — it's fear. Not design. The document doesn't hold it, the terror of what happens if the document fails holds it.

Iris Holm: And that operative mechanism is identical across both regime types. The surface rules differ. The thing underneath is the same.

Cyrus Reed: Okay but — actually, no — that makes the survivorship bias way worse than I thought. Because if fear is the mechanism, we can only see the systems where the fear held. We literally cannot observe the equilibrium breaking in the cases that — wait, those cases are just gone.

Iris Holm: Gone or transformed. The Roman Republic's fear equilibrium broke. Factions decided the stakes were too high to accept outcomes. The republic became something else entirely. We don't get to compare that Rome to anything — it stopped being Rome.

Cyrus Reed: So the comparison between monarchy and republic might just be — moot? Like we might not have enough data to even run it cleanly?

Iris Holm: Put it this way. A senior noble — say, autumn 1422, Henry V just died, infant heir — that noble is in his hall, privately running numbers. Back the infant and the regency council, or back the stronger claimant who can actually hold the border? That calculation, every powerful lord in England making it simultaneously, that is the succession system. Not the hereditary principle. Not the document.

Cyrus Reed: And if enough of them — I mean, the moment one faction decides it can win by contesting it, the fear breaks. And then the regime type is basically decorative.

Iris Holm: Decorative. That's the word. The question then is: under what conditions does one system's fear mechanism collapse catastrophically while the other's stays manageable? Because the regime label won't tell you. The label is downstream of that answer.

Cyrus Reed: And we don't — wait, do we actually have an answer to that? Because that feels like the thing everything else was building toward.

Iris Holm: Not a clean answer. But the frame sharpened. The question we came in with — which system is safer — that's the wrong question. The one worth asking is under what conditions does one system's failure mode become catastrophic while the other's stays survivable.

Cyrus Reed: And the answer to that isn't — wait, it's not monarchy or republic. It's whether elites are more afraid of the alternative than they are of accepting an outcome they hate. That's the actual load-bearing thing. The regime label is just — it's almost notational.

Iris Holm: Monarchies fail when the hereditary principle delivers someone who breaks the fear — an incompetent heir, a dynastic crisis, the nobles do the math and decide the regency council can't hold. Republics fail when the procedural rules stop being the shared frame — factionalism, legitimacy collapse, the Roman Republic path. Neither is survivable by default.

Cyrus Reed: Huh. And which one actually survives — I mean, that depends on what's around the regime when it starts to crack. The institutions. The courts. Whether the administration is real or just a patronage network dressed up.

Iris Holm: Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's piece of that — the non-events piece — applies symmetrically. Both systems stabilize through fear of what doesn't happen. Both collapse when that fear tips the wrong way. The regime type is almost decorative at that point.

Cyrus Reed: That's actually — yeah, that's where I landed too. We spent all this time asking monarchy versus republic, and the actual question is just: what breaks the fear, and when it breaks, can you rebuild it inside the same system or do you end up with something else entirely. Like Rome ended up with something else entirely.

Iris Holm: Good place to stop. That question doesn't have a tidy answer, and I'd be suspicious of anyone who said it did.