Iris Holm: Hey, you look like someone who's been staring at a map too long. I'm going to give you a figure, and you tell me what it does to your picture of the Sahel: 3.5 percent.
Hana Field: Oh, that's the AQIM number. Al-Qaeda's only formal affiliate in the Sahel, 3.5 percent of non-state violence since 1997. And honestly, it rearranged the furniture in my head.
Iris Holm: How, specifically?
Hana Field: So I'd been picturing an empty map. Sand, a few dark figures drifting across it. And that number says no, the space is full, it's just full of people who aren't the famous ones. Militias, smugglers, networks that recruit and organize wherever nobody can say stop.
Iris Holm: Here's my plain-words version of why. Think of a game with one referee everyone accepts. Take the referee away, or make the whistle meaningless, and someone else grabs it. Then the game gets rough.
Hana Field: Mm, and the grown-up name for the referee is Max Weber's: the state claims the exclusive right to legitimate force inside a territory. State capacity is whether it can really hold that, and collect taxes, enforce law, provide public goods. That's different from just having control.
Iris Holm: Right. Which leaves a puzzle. If the space is crowded, what's actually missing?
Hana Field: What's missing is probably the boring part. Not the guns, the paperwork. And I keep wondering what that actually looks like, you know, in a country where it's all there.
Iris Holm: Two pillars. Besley and Persson. Fiscal capacity: the state can sustainably tax. Legal capacity: property rights, contracts, rule of law. Both. Not one.
Hana Field: And the pillars matter because...?
Iris Holm: Because they arrive together. Look, Besley and Persson call them development clusters. High capacity, peace, and income coexist for decades. And the mirror image: low capacity, civil conflict, poverty. Symmetrical.
Hana Field: Sticky, too, right? Nobody in the weak cluster has much reason to build the tax office, and and nobody wants to put money into a factory while a civil war's going on, so the thing that would fix it never gets funded.
Iris Holm: That's the surface story. Cross-national data even says capacity props up regime stability in autocracies and democracies alike.
Hana Field: So is capacity the lever? Or, and I'm asking, not objecting, are all three just symptoms of the same long history?
Iris Holm: Now that's the question. And I'd go one step further. I mean, how do you measure capacity? V-Dem codes effective territorial control, authority over insurgents and criminal groups. That's order. Order as the input, order as the outcome.
Hana Field: Oh. So a state that's stable looks capable because it's stable.
Iris Holm: Circular. And then Charles Tilly runs the arrow backward. War made the state, and the state made war. European rulers built fiscal and administrative capacity because interstate competition forced them to extract and centralize.
Hana Field: Wait. So violence came first, and the tax office was the scar?
Iris Holm: Roughly. So what would falsify the thesis? A low-capacity region with durable peace. Or a high-capacity one at chronic war. Name one. Otherwise it just says stable states are stable.
Hana Field: Well, there's a case that complicates your falsification test. Somalia. The state collapses in the early 1990s, and then two-plus decades of endemic conflict, criminal governance, armed factions. And the word everybody uses for it is 'ungoverned.'
Iris Holm: Which is the textbook void. Al-Shabaab comes out of exactly that space.
Hana Field: It does. And you can watch it spread. Out of Somalia into Kenya, into Ethiopia, along kinship networks, across borders that are mostly a line on a map.
Iris Holm: Inkblot logic. Drop ink on the ungoverned core, it bleeds outward into whatever's adjacent. Kinship ties are the paper fibers. Porous border, no resistance.
Hana Field: Oh, I like that. But then why did it grow? Was it only that nobody was there to stop it?
Iris Holm: Not only. Relative deprivation. People who feel marginalized, grievance first, then mobilization. Look, that complements the capacity story. It doesn't replace it.
Hana Field: Can I put a person in it? A Tuesday morning in a Mogadishu market. She's a composite, I'm not claiming a real woman. A trader opens her stall in the early light, diesel and cardamom tea in the air, and before noon she's already worked out who she'll pay, who she'll avoid, and who will actually honor a dispute. And she does it the way you check the weather.
Iris Holm: And the reporting says Al-Shabaab collects 'taxes' even in government-held areas.
Hana Field: Right. So she pays them, maybe pays the city, and the thing she keeps on the stall is a small padlock. It says what she'd never say out loud: I'm managing this alone.
Iris Holm: Then she isn't ungoverned. Joel Migdal's point. Weak-state citizens live under a melange of overlapping actors. The question is who governs, not whether anyone does.
Hana Field: And here's what surprised me. A state that's absent and a state that arrives uninvited might feel the same to her. Either way, someone else decides.
Iris Holm: Hold on. That's Timor-Leste, isn't it? Interventions overriding locally negotiated settlements.
Hana Field: Yes, exactly that. So if a patchwork can deliver order, what is capacity even measuring?
Iris Holm: I mean, maybe whose order. And the part that comes later gets uglier: capacity is a tool, and tools serve whoever holds them.
Hana Field: But wait. If capacity is a tool, then the thing we've been calling stability, is that just a state being good at staying in charge? Because a tax office can fund a school. It can also fund a secret police.
Iris Holm: Both. A capable state can mobilize resources for repression. And for offensive war. Same machinery, different use.
Iris Holm: And here's what I think the room misses. Strong states produce balancing. A capable state's neighbors respond. So build capacity in one place, and you may get an arms race next door.
Hana Field: Oh. So the thing that's supposed to make the region calmer is the thing the neighbors read as a threat?
Iris Holm: Right. Tilly again. War made the state, and the state made war. It runs both directions.
Hana Field: That's the oh-THAT's-why for me. So the clusters we talked about, the peaceful rich ones, they might be peaceful partly because nobody's currently balancing against them.
Iris Holm: Maybe. I wouldn't claim it. But now the wealth piece. The thesis says capacity is independent of resource wealth. I don't think it is. It's upstream.
Hana Field: Upstream how? Because I'd have guessed money helps you build the tax office, and and the paperwork, all of it.
Iris Holm: Resource curse. Wealth fails to build strong institutions. It can hollow them out. Elites treat the state as a private project, capture the rents, and never need to tax anyone. Look, no tax bargain, no fiscal capacity.
Hana Field: So wealth doesn't sit beside capacity. It eats it. And then stability for whom? If the thesis tracks whoever holds power for longest, that's a very different claim, you know, than peace for the woman with the padlock.
Iris Holm: That's the open question. Stability, or durability of whoever holds power? And one more. International actors who fuel resource conflicts. Do they ever get scrutinized?
Hana Field: Which leads outward, doesn't it? Because outsiders also try to build capacity. Timor-Leste, with the UN transitional authority, overrode locally negotiated settlements with prescriptive design. And Liberia and Sierra Leone tried turning conflict resources into peace resources, and risked recreating the pre-war arrangements.
Iris Holm: So capacity is a tool. What kind, built by whom, for whose benefit. And how a war ends matters: rebel victory or negotiated settlement changes how fast fiscal capacity recovers. The ending matters as much as what existed before.
Hana Field: Mm. The ending reaching into the tax office. A war stops, and the way it stopped is still sitting in the building years later, deciding how fast anyone can collect a shilling. And then outsiders arrive to help, and in Timor-Leste, and Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the help can overwrite what people negotiated among themselves and freeze in the very arrangements that caused the war.
Iris Holm: Freeze in. Say more.
Hana Field: I mean, picture the elder again. He made a hard peace with his neighbors, nobody wrote it down, and then a better design lands on top of it. The design quietly restores who held the power before the fighting. So the repair and the cause are the same thing, and nobody on the plane sees that.
Iris Holm: Right. Which is the cost the capacity thesis hides. Build the center, and you may be building the grievance.
Iris Holm: Go back to her stall. Her question isn't whether the state is strong. Look, it's which of them will still be here in March? Al-Shabaab, the city, the elder. She's pricing durability, not capacity.
Hana Field: And that's a different yardstick entirely. Weber gives us the state's claim to legitimate force. But legitimate to whom? If she accepts whoever governs her, is that stability? Or is that just exhaustion that looks like peace?
Iris Holm: I can't separate them. Honestly. Acceptance can be consent. It can be resignation. The data wouldn't tell you which.
Hana Field: So where did you land? On the measuring?
Iris Holm: Uneasy. Central capacity is easier to count. Acceptance is closer to the truth, and probably unmeasurable. I'd want both, and I don't know what to do when they disagree.
Hana Field: Same, and I think that's okay. I'll be thinking about that padlock for a while. It's small, and it's holding up her whole morning, and nobody's counting it anywhere.
Iris Holm: A padlock isn't in any dataset. Fair enough. Thanks for the stall.