Lila Soto: Iris — I want to start with a weird thought I had on the way in. You know how sometimes a rule exists mostly because everyone agrees to pretend it's being followed?
Lila Soto: Dollar-gold convertibility. Thirty-five dollars per ounce — that was the core promise of the entire Bretton Woods system, the thing forty-four countries agreed to in that hotel in New Hampshire in July 1944. And the US was running out of gold to back it by 1968. The system kept going for three more years on — I don't know, momentum? Habit?
Iris Holm: Collective hallucination is the more precise term.
Lila Soto: Okay, yeah — and then Nixon formally ends it in 1971, the hallucination should shatter, and instead the dollar just keeps being the global reserve currency. No real alternative emerges. The International Monetary Fund keeps functioning. The World Bank keeps functioning. It's — huh — it's like the fiction was load-bearing but then it wasn't?
Iris Holm: The question is what was actually load-bearing. Because something was. The US held two-thirds of the world's gold when Harry Dexter White sat across from John Maynard Keynes in 1944. That's not a rule. That's a fact about power.
Lila Soto: And Keynes knew that — I think that's what's so strange about this whole story. He proposed the bancor specifically because he could see that building the system around a single nation's currency was a trap. He loses the argument. White's dollar-centric plan wins. And then the trap closes exactly when Keynes said it would.
Iris Holm: So why did the trap closing not end the system? That's where I want to stay.
Lila Soto: Yeah — what was actually holding the dollar up when the gold was gone.
Iris Holm: What was holding it up — that's actually the coordination problem in plain language. Think about a cargo ship leaving São Paulo for Seoul. The Brazilian exporter wants reais, the Korean importer is holding won, and neither one trusts the other's currency to hold its value by the time the invoice clears. Without a third thing they both believe in, the deal either doesn't happen or it gets incredibly expensive to insure.
Lila Soto: So the dollar was that third thing.
Iris Holm: Exactly that. The dollar was the medium both sides agreed to trust. And Bretton Woods was 44 countries in one room in New Hampshire deciding — formally — to solve that fragmentation at global scale.
Lila Soto: And the reason they needed a room to decide it is that the interwar years had already shown what happens when you don't. I mean — competitive devaluations, exchange controls, everyone weaponizing their own currency to gain an edge. It wasn't abstract. It collapsed trade.
Iris Holm: Right. That's the live demonstration. So in 1944 the question isn't theoretical — it's 'we just watched that break everything, what do we build instead.'
Lila Soto: And what they built was — okay, the IMF to administer the exchange-rate rules and provide liquidity when a country hit a crisis, and the World Bank to handle reconstruction. Those aren't just bureaucracies. They're answers to specific failure modes.
Iris Holm: Four specific ones. Settlement, liquidity, exchange-rate coordination, dispute resolution. Any system — not just Bretton Woods — has to supply all four or it starts leaking at the joint it missed.
Lila Soto: Wait — so the gold convertibility at thirty-five dollars an ounce, that was the settlement anchor. That's what made the dollar believable as the common medium.
Iris Holm: It was the credible restraint mechanism. The US couldn't just print money freely if it owed you gold on demand. That constraint is what made every other country willing to peg to the dollar instead of to something else.
Lila Soto: But here's what I'm kind of turning over — the constraint was always only as real as US willingness to honor it. Which, mm, is not a constraint. That's a promise.
Iris Holm: And Keynes saw that in 1944. The bancor was his engineering fix — a supranational currency not issued by any single country, so no single country could break the promise. White's plan won because the US had the gold and the military. Not because White's logic was tighter.
Lila Soto: So the São Paulo–Seoul cargo ship is still running on a promise made by a country that stopped formally backing it in 1971. That's — yeah, that's the thing that needs unpacking.
Iris Holm: And that promise had a structural crack baked into it from day one. Not discovered — baked in.
Lila Soto: The Triffin thing.
Iris Holm: The Triffin thing. Any country whose currency is the global reserve has to run persistent deficits — has to — to push enough of its currency out into the world for everyone else to use. But those deficits, over time, erode confidence in the currency. It's not a risk. It's a mathematical consequence.
Lila Soto: And Keynes — I mean, he basically saw this before Triffin named it. The bancor sidesteps the whole thing because it's not issued by any single country. No single treasury running deficits. No single government choosing between its own economy and the world's liquidity needs.
Iris Holm: White's plan guaranteed the problem. That's the part. It didn't just ignore the dilemma — it embedded it.
Lila Soto: Huh. So White wins politically and what he actually wins is — a ticking clock.
Iris Holm: The London Gold Pool breaking in 1968 is the clock hitting zero. The US had already run out of gold three years before Nixon's announcement. Bretton Woods was technically insolvent. It just kept operating because no one wanted to be the country that called it.
Lila Soto: Wait — 1968, not 1971? Three years of everyone knowing and nobody saying anything?
Iris Holm: The London Gold Pool — a consortium of central banks propping up the thirty-five dollar price — it collapsed in March 1968. After that the two-tier gold market opens. Official price holds for governments, but the private market goes higher. That's not a functioning convertibility system. That's a fiction being maintained by mutual agreement.
Lila Soto: And the credible restraint — the whole idea that the US would voluntarily subordinate its own monetary interests to keep convertibility real — that was already gone by then. The restraint just hadn't been officially retired yet.
Iris Holm: Which is what makes 1971 interesting in a way we haven't gotten to yet — because the dollar survives the official end of convertibility, and that tells you something about what was actually holding it up. And that part gets worse before it gets better.
Lila Soto: Oh, I know — the question underneath that is almost scarier than the dilemma itself. Like, what does it mean that the system worked better as a myth than as a mechanism?
Iris Holm: Keynes would say it means White built a system that required the hegemon to be saintly. And saints don't last.
Lila Soto: And saints don't last — which is exactly what 1971 proves. Because the moment the gold is officially gone, you'd expect a scramble. Some country breaks for the exit. And instead, nothing. The dollar just keeps going.
Iris Holm: That's the natural experiment. Remove the stated foundation. Measure the collapse. Collapse doesn't come. What does that tell you?
Lila Soto: That the foundation was never the gold.
Iris Holm: Hegemonic Stability Theory. That's the name for what the experiment reveals. The actual mechanism was always: one dominant state, willing and able to supply the reserve currency, enforce the rules, act as lender of last resort. Gold convertibility was — it was the costume. The power was the body underneath.
Lila Soto: Huh. So credible restraint — the whole idea that the US was choosing to honor the constraint — that was always just a story the system told about itself.
Iris Holm: The restraint was real when the power enforced it. When the power decided the restraint was inconvenient, the restraint went away. And the system didn't notice.
Lila Soto: Okay but — wait, that's actually kind of alarming for the BRICS conversation. Because if the dollar survived 1971 purely on power and network effects, then the question for any alternative isn't 'can you do local-currency settlement.' It's 'do you have equivalent power.'
Iris Holm: And China and Russia shifting their bilateral trade to yuan and rubles — that's real. That happened. But it's one corridor.
Lila Soto: One corridor. Yeah, I mean — the pre-1944 world was full of bilateral corridors. That's exactly what Bretton Woods was designed to get rid of.
Iris Holm: So local-currency settlement between BRICS partners, taken to its limit, doesn't build a unified alternative. It recreates the bilateral patchwork. Every pair of countries negotiating their own arrangement — that's the fragmentation problem the whole system was invented to escape.
Lila Soto: And the modeling that suggested a majority of countries might actually prefer a BRICS-bloc currency — that was using 2012 trade network data. Before Belt and Road, before yuan internationalization really moves, before the Russia sanctions change every calculation.
Iris Holm: Twelve years stale. The sanctions regime alone rewrites the preference map — a country deciding in 2024 whether to route settlement outside SWIFT is weighing a completely different risk environment than a 2012 model captures.
Lila Soto: So the modeling tells us countries might want an alternative. It doesn't tell us they can build one that actually solves all four functions — settlement, liquidity, coordination, arbitration.
Iris Holm: Especially arbitration. That's the one nobody's solved. BRICS can build payment networks, can route around SWIFT — but when a bilateral deal breaks down, who calls the ruling? That's not a function. That's a power claim dressed as a function.
Lila Soto: And right now the answer is — still the US. Which is maybe the most honest description of what post-Bretton Woods dollar hegemony actually is. Not a system. A standing answer to the question 'who decides when it breaks.'
Iris Holm: And that's exactly where the bancor's ghost comes back. Because Keynes's argument in 1944 wasn't just 'the dollar is a bad choice.' It was: any single nation's currency fails this test eventually. The political constraint — states will not surrender monetary sovereignty to a synthetic supranational currency — that constraint didn't die with the bancor. It's still the ceiling for BRICS, for the IMF's SDR, for every multilateral proposal since.
Lila Soto: So the multipolar moment isn't actually a new question. It's — yeah, it's the same question White and Keynes were arguing about, except now nobody has the gold and the guns to just win it.
Iris Holm: That's the timing problem. The dollar is already partially multipolar — yuan, euro, they handle real settlement volume. But no alternative performs all four functions. And the US hegemonic power that's been covering the gap is eroding. Slowly, unevenly — but it's eroding. The race isn't between currencies. It's between that erosion rate and the construction speed of whatever comes next.
Lila Soto: And if the construction is too slow — I mean, 1944 showed you can have the technically better answer and still lose because someone else already has the architecture standing. What does the gap look like if nobody builds fast enough?
Iris Holm: Fragmentation. Not one system failing — no system. Which is maybe where we started, actually. That cargo ship leaving São Paulo. The whole reason Bretton Woods happened is that the alternative was forty-four countries each pretending their own currency was trustworthy enough.
Lila Soto: Huh. We opened with a rule everyone agreed to pretend was being followed. And I think — I mean, we might be closing with the same thing, just the pretense is different now. It's not gold convertibility anymore. It's the pretense that the arbiter is still capable of arbitrating.
Iris Holm: Unresolved. Which is the honest place for it. Thanks for the thinking.