Megan Skiendel: Miles — tell me if this reads as strange to you as it does to me: the global monetary order that emerged from 1944 was explicitly not what the economist who designed it wanted.
Miles Ashworth: You mean Keynes.
Megan Skiendel: John Maynard Keynes, yes — leading the UK delegation. He came in with the bancor. A supranational currency unit, specifically designed so no single nation's money anchors the whole system. And he lost — to Harry Dexter White's 'unitas,' which accomplished structurally the opposite thing by making the dollar the pivot.
Miles Ashworth: Now, 'lost' is quite a polite way to put it. Because the outcome was arguably decided before 44 nations gathered at the Mount Washington Hotel in July 1944. The US-UK Joint Statement, April 21st — before the conference formally opens — already reflects the dollar-centric compromise. So what everyone calls the Bretton Woods negotiation is, in a fairly important sense, a signing ceremony.
Megan Skiendel: Right — but the reason White's plan prevailed wasn't that it was better economics. Congress refused to let American resources flow to a supranational body. The US held the leverage, so the dollar won. That's domestic politics producing international monetary architecture.
Miles Ashworth: Which makes the whole thing a bait-and-switch, actually — not a technical disagreement between two economists. Keynes is proposing genuine neutrality, White is proposing something that looks neutral and institutionalizes American advantage. And this is presented to the world as cooperative multilateralism.
Megan Skiendel: And it held — until Nixon suspended convertibility on August 15th, 1971. At which point the architecture collapses.
Miles Ashworth: Except — the dollar doesn't collapse with it.
Megan Skiendel: Which is the part that broke my brain a little, honestly. Sterling devalued in November 1967 — 14.3%, down to two dollars forty — and that effectively ended the pound's reserve role. So we have a template for how reserve currencies fall. The dollar should have followed.
Miles Ashworth: It did not follow. And so the question — the one I find genuinely worth sitting with — is whether the dollar is dominant because of institutional depth, or whether it's dominant simply because nobody has yet had permission to build something else.
Megan Skiendel: That is not a small distinction.
Miles Ashworth: No. One of those is strength. The other is just — absence of rebellion. And those look identical right up until the moment they don't.
Megan Skiendel: But here's what that 'absence of rebellion' was actually built on — because I think that's the thing that needs unpacking. The system had a fatal contradiction inside it from day one. Not a risk. Not a flaw someone could have patched. A structural impossibility.
Megan Skiendel: Imagine a small town where one family's IOU is the only currency everyone trades in. For the town to grow — more shops, more deals, more trade — that family has to keep issuing more IOUs. But the more IOUs they issue, the less anyone trusts they can actually pay them back. That's it. That's the whole thing. The dollar was that family's IOU.
Miles Ashworth: And Robert Triffin put that in writing in 1960.
Megan Skiendel: Exactly — 1960, he publishes it. The US must run persistent balance-of-payments deficits to supply enough dollars to the world. But those same deficits erode confidence in the gold peg at thirty-five dollars per ounce. You cannot do both. You cannot supply global liquidity and maintain gold credibility. It's not a tension. It's a contradiction.
Miles Ashworth: And the credibility problem was deferred because, in 1960, the US was nearly half of world GDP. The anchor felt — well, it felt plausible. That's genuinely a lot of economic weight to back a currency.
Megan Skiendel: Right — but that number actually makes the trap worse, not better. Because global trade grows, dollar demand grows with it, and now you're issuing more IOUs against the same gold stock. The credibility erodes not because anyone made a bad decision. It erodes because the system is working.
Miles Ashworth: This is — frankly, that's almost elegant in how terrible it is. The better the system functions, the faster it destroys itself.
Megan Skiendel: And Triffin saw it eleven years before Nixon actually pulled the trigger in '71. So when the gold window closes — the system isn't shocked into failure. It's just finally admitting what it always was.
Miles Ashworth: Which reframes the Nixon Shock as — not a shock at all, really. More of a confession.
Megan Skiendel: Nobody at Bretton Woods in July 1944 could fix this. It wasn't a design oversight. The deficit requirement was the mechanism for supplying liquidity. You couldn't remove it without removing the system.
Miles Ashworth: So what you're saying is that 44 nations signed onto something that had a structural expiration date, and the question was never whether it would collapse — only when and what it would look like afterward.
Megan Skiendel: Exactly — and what that means for 1971 is that Nixon wasn't breaking the system. He was just the one holding the pen when the expiration date hit. August 15th, the gold window closes, and by any logic we'd applied to sterling four years earlier, that should have been the dollar's 1967 moment.
Miles Ashworth: And sterling's fall was — look, it was swift. November 18th, 1967, fourteen-point-three percent devaluation overnight, and the sterling-area countries didn't deliberate. They moved to dollars almost immediately. No loyalty, no transition period.
Megan Skiendel: So why didn't that happen to the dollar in '71?
Miles Ashworth: Well — this is the thing I keep prodding at — the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971, they tried to reset. New exchange rates, same basic framework. And then by 1973 that collapses too, the whole fixed-rate architecture just dissolves into floating rates. And the dollar is still standing.
Megan Skiendel: Still standing without the one thing it was supposedly backed by.
Miles Ashworth: Which tells you — actually, no, wait — it tells you that the gold convertibility was never the actual load-bearing wall. It was window dressing for something that was holding up the structure from underneath.
Megan Skiendel: And I've sat in rooms where central bank reserve managers from emerging markets have said almost exactly that — not in those words, but the logic. They didn't hold dollars because of Bretton Woods rules. They held dollars because everything priced in dollars. Oil, commodities, trade contracts. You couldn't opt out without immediately losing on every transaction you touched.
Miles Ashworth: So the gold standard wasn't the foundation — the network was.
Megan Skiendel: The network, the depth of US financial markets, the sheer volume of dollar-denominated instruments. Remove the gold peg and none of that disappears. Sterling didn't have that. The sterling area was geopolitical — Commonwealth ties, colonial legacy. The dollar area was arithmetic.
Miles Ashworth: And arithmetic is frankly harder to escape than loyalty. Susan Strange made roughly this argument — that the dollar's power after '71 was structural, not monetary. The currency survived the monetary shock because it was already embedded in a different kind of architecture entirely.
Megan Skiendel: Which is — honestly that's the thing that makes the BRICS conversation feel slightly unreal to me. Because you can announce de-dollarization intentions. What you cannot easily announce is a replacement for the infrastructure.
Miles Ashworth: And that infrastructure — the IMF voting weights, World Bank conditionality, the switching costs that make leaving genuinely expensive regardless of what the economics say — that's the layer we haven't even touched yet, and it's the part that actually explains why rebellion hasn't happened.
Megan Skiendel: And whether BRICS runs into that same wall — it genuinely gets complicated.
Miles Ashworth: And that wall has a very specific shape, which I don't think gets named precisely enough. The IMF wasn't just an institution — it was built with US-weighted voting that gave Washington an effective veto. That's not influence. That's structural control dressed as multilateralism.
Megan Skiendel: The veto is the part people keep soft-pedaling. You can't pass a major IMF resolution if the US opposes it. That's baked into the founding architecture.
Miles Ashworth: And the World Bank runs the same logic through lending conditionality — if you want development financing, the terms reflect US governance priorities. That's not incidental. That is the mechanism.
Megan Skiendel: And both of those survived 1971 completely intact. The monetary rules collapsed — the gold peg, the fixed rates, gone by 1973. The institutions? Still running. Still shaping who gets capital and on what terms.
Miles Ashworth: Which is — actually, that's the thing. The monetary system failed and the institutional system didn't even flinch.
Megan Skiendel: Because they weren't the same thing. And I think that's the frame the Reserve Currency Ecosystem Framework is actually trying to capture — the RCEF argument is that reserve-currency leadership isn't determined by economic or military strength alone. It's an integrated ecosystem. Markets, institutions, legal credibility, geopolitical relationships. All of it has to be replicated simultaneously or none of it transfers.
Miles Ashworth: So the switching cost isn't the exchange rate. It's rebuilding the entire ecosystem.
Megan Skiendel: Which is why — look, I've watched emerging-market central bank conversations in real time. Everyone says they want dollar alternatives. But the moment you actually try to move reserves out at scale, you lose on the spread immediately. The dollar infrastructure is so deep you're paying a tax just for attempting the exit. It's not ideology. It's arithmetic.
Miles Ashworth: And BRICS — formed 2009, now ten countries — that's the most organized expression of the desire to escape that arithmetic. And the 2008 crisis is what made it urgent policy conversation rather than academic.
Megan Skiendel: But no competing currency has actually displaced the dollar. Not in trade invoicing, not in foreign exchange reserves, not in commodity pricing. The announcements keep coming. The displacement hasn't.
Miles Ashworth: Susan Strange called this the exorbitant privilege — but she also said it carries structural vulnerabilities. The question is whether those vulnerabilities ever compound to an actual breaking point, or whether the switching costs just permanently exceed them.
Megan Skiendel: And that's — wait, that's actually the question that doesn't have a clean answer yet. Because sterling felt permanent until November 18th, 1967, and then it was over in a single devaluation. The ecosystem didn't save it.
Miles Ashworth: Although sterling's ecosystem was geopolitical — Commonwealth ties, colonial legacy, as we said. The dollar's ecosystem is transactional. Which may be more durable, or may be more brittle depending on whether the transactions stay attractive.
Megan Skiendel: So the real question isn't whether BRICS can announce an alternative. It's whether the cost of staying in the dollar system ever exceeds the cost of actually building the ecosystem from scratch. And so far — nobody's cleared that bar.
Miles Ashworth: And that's the thing that keeps pulling me back to sterling. November '67 — Britain didn't lose the pound's reserve role because someone built something better. There was no superior alternative waiting in the wings. It lost it because it simply ran out of the fiscal capacity to keep sustaining the role. That's a different kind of failure. That's exhaustion, not defeat.
Megan Skiendel: And the Philadelphia Fed has flagged something very close to that logic about the dollar — that long-run trade deficit accumulation poses real risks if reserve status ever shifts. The exorbitant privilege isn't free. It's just — the bill is deferred.
Miles Ashworth: Which is — well, that's the question I genuinely cannot answer, actually. Whether the US faces that same fiscal exhaustion eventually. Not whether the system is theoretically vulnerable — Triffin settled that in 1960. But whether institutional depth can actually outlast the economics. Or whether, at some point, the arithmetic just wins.
Megan Skiendel: And I don't think anyone knows. That's the honest answer. De-dollarization isn't really a question of whether the system is vulnerable. It's a question of when conditions change enough to make the exit cost worth paying. The vulnerability is structural. The timing is — nobody has that.
Miles Ashworth: Resilient, or simply untested at the right pressure point.
Megan Skiendel: That's exactly the thing I'm still turning over. Because sterling felt permanent right up until it wasn't. And I can't tell you which one the dollar is. Nobody can, yet.
Miles Ashworth: Good place to leave it, I think. Genuinely unresolved — which is, frankly, the only honest verdict available. Thanks for the thinking.