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Cover art for Zelenskiy says holding elections now would destroy Ukraine—but democratic pressure mounts

Zelenskiy says holding elections now would destroy Ukraine—but democratic pressure mounts

August 24, 2026 · 9 min

Eliza Ward & Brian Reed

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whose presidential term expired in May 2024, says wartime elections would be 'a tsunami that will split Ukraine' — but over two years later he has never named a concrete condition for when they could happen, leaving martial law, continuous since February 2022, with no defined off-switch.

On August 23, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated at a press meeting attended by the Kyiv Independent and international outlets that holding elections during the ongoing full-scale Russian invasion would "destroy" Ukraine.

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About this episode

Zelenskyy's presidential term expired in May 2024. By his own August 23rd statement, he'll hold elections 'once security allows.' The problem: he has never said what that means. No ceasefire line, no withdrawal benchmark, no threshold of any kind. This episode works through why that absence is the actual story — not the headline about a fired defense minister demanding a vote. The episode traces the specific fracture that exposed the issue: Mykhailo Fedorov, dismissed from his post, became the first major Ukrainian political figure since the 2022 invasion to publicly call for wartime elections. His own supporters, who had protested his firing in the streets, rejected the call the moment he packaged it with a corruption accusation against Zelenskyy. That collapse tells you something about where democratic pressure in Ukraine actually stands right now. It also works through what makes Zelenskyy's position genuinely strong — the constitutional prohibition is real, the security risk is real, the historical precedent of Allied democracies suspending wartime elections is real — and what makes it convenient. When Putin and Trump are on the same side of the ledger as your domestic critics, you never have to separate your legitimate argument from your political interest. They fuse. The episode ends on a simple, specific watch signal: does Zelenskyy ever name an actual condition? Until he does, the emergency brake and the cage are the same object.

Frequently asked

Why won't Zelenskyy hold elections during the war?

Zelenskyy argues wartime elections would be 'a tsunami that will split Ukraine,' citing a constitutional prohibition on voting under martial law, genuine security risks including active Russian missile strikes, and a Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll showing 57% of Ukrainians prefer waiting until fighting ends.

When did Zelenskyy's presidential term expire?

Zelenskyy's presidential term expired in May 2024. As of August 2026, he has governed for over two years beyond that mandate without a fresh electoral mandate, with martial law — continuously in force since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 — serving as the legal basis for postponing a vote.

Who called for wartime elections in Ukraine and why did it backfire?

Ukraine's fired defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov called for wartime presidential elections — the first major Ukrainian political figure to do so since the 2022 invasion. His own supporters, who had protested his dismissal, rejected the demand once he paired it with corruption accusations against Zelenskyy, making the call look like a personal campaign rather than a democratic principle.

What does the Ukrainian public think about holding elections during the war?

A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll from August 5 found 57% of Ukrainians support waiting until fighting ends before holding elections. Analysts note, however, that this opinion formed in a wartime information environment where opposition arguments are difficult to make freely, meaning it reflects risk calculation more than unconditional endorsement of indefinite postponement.

What would trigger elections in Ukraine after the war?

Ukraine's Central Election Commission has stated that election preparation can only begin after martial law ends — but Zelenskyy has never defined what 'security allows' means in concrete terms: no ceasefire threshold, no withdrawal benchmark, no named condition. No mechanism inside the current Ukrainian framework can compel him to set one.

Grounded in 3 sources
Wartime elections would 'destroy' Ukraine, says Zelensky · france24.com
Wartime election would 'destroy' Ukraine, Zelenskiy says - Reuters · reuters.com
Zelenskyy rejects Mykhailo Fedorov's wartime election call · theguardian.com
Read transcript

Eliza Ward: Hey, good to be here.

Brian Reed: Yeah, likewise — you've been watching the Ukraine stuff this morning?

Eliza Ward: Yeah. Zelenskyy spoke to journalists yesterday — August 23rd — and said holding elections during the war would, and this is the quote, be 'a tsunami for the state that will split Ukraine.' The Kyiv Independent was in the room.

Brian Reed: That's a strong word. 'Destroy.'

Eliza Ward: He also used 'destroy,' yeah. And the thing is — this is actually his first direct public response to Mykhailo Fedorov. Fedorov called for wartime elections, which... no major Ukrainian political figure had done that since the full-scale invasion started in 2022.

Brian Reed: So it took a fired defense minister to break a two-year taboo and force Zelenskyy to answer publicly.

Eliza Ward: Right — and Fedorov's dismissal had already triggered street protests. People were out defending him. Then he makes the election call and... his own supporters reject it.

Brian Reed: Wait — the same people who protested his firing?

Eliza Ward: The same people, yeah. And that's actually the thing that cuts through the noise here — because the headline is 'fired minister calls for elections,' which sounds like a democratic challenge. But what the concrete evidence shows is that even his own coalition looked at it and said no.

Brian Reed: Which means — wait, let me get this right — the protest wasn't about elections at all.

Eliza Ward: It was about Fedorov specifically. His reinstatement. The moment he pivoted to 'and also, Zelenskyy's corrupt, hold elections' — his own people peeled off.

Brian Reed: So think of it this way. A general gets fired, supporters flood the streets for him, and then he announces he wants to run against the president. Suddenly his old allies aren't sure if they're defending democracy or just his career.

Eliza Ward: That's exactly the split. And that's what POLITICO Europe flagged — they called him 'a new rival' to Zelenskyy. Once that framing lands, the corruption critique and the election call stop looking like principle and start looking like a platform.

Brian Reed: Right — but here's what I don't want us to skip past. Zelenskyy's term expired May 2024. We're in August 2026. That's over two years governing without a fresh mandate. Does the Fedorov motive question actually change that underlying fact?

Eliza Ward: No, it doesn't — and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll from August 5th, 57% saying wait until fighting ends, that's not a ringing endorsement of indefinite postponement either. It's just people doing a risk calculation in wartime.

Brian Reed: So the real signal buried in this — the thing that's actually new — isn't that someone demanded elections. It's that Fedorov's own supporters rejected it once he packaged it with a corruption accusation. That fracture tells you the demand wasn't coming from democratic conviction.

Eliza Ward: Right. And the question now is whether anyone makes the same call without that baggage attached — because that would be a different story.

Brian Reed: But hang on — that clean story about Fedorov's motives, that's actually the take I think is circulating too easily right now. Because the framing going around is that Zelenskyy's case is just... strong. Constitutional prohibition, real security risk, majority public support. Done.

Eliza Ward: Yeah, and I don't buy that it's that clean.

Brian Reed: Right — so what's wrong with it exactly? Because on August 22nd, the day before his statement, Russia hit a locomotive in Kyiv with a missile and drone strike. And they're reportedly massing ballistic missiles and weighing whether to mobilize another 300,000 soldiers. That's not a constructed threat.

Eliza Ward: No, the security case has real weight. The problem is — wait, actually this is the specific thing — Putin has called for Ukraine to hold elections. Trump has called for it too. So when Zelenskyy bundles the constitutional grounds, the genuine security risk, and his own incumbency protection into one 'tsunami' frame, he gets to point at Putin and say anyone asking this question is on the wrong side.

Brian Reed: So the geopolitical noise does the work for him.

Eliza Ward: It's — yeah. It makes the question itself politically toxic. Which suits him. And look, Allied democracies suspended elections in World War II. That precedent is real. The Ukrainian Central Election Commission has literally said preparation can only begin once martial law ends. These are not invented guardrails. But because Putin and Trump are on the same side of the ledger as Fedorov, Zelenskyy doesn't have to separate his legitimate argument from his political interest. They're fused.

Brian Reed: The part I don't get — does anyone in Kyiv actually try to separate them? Like publicly?

Eliza Ward: That's the gap. And it connects to something bigger that we haven't gotten to yet — martial law has been continuous since February 2022, four-plus years, and Zelenskyy hasn't named a threshold for when it ends. That structural piece is where this really gets uncomfortable.

Brian Reed: So the argument that looks like a security case might actually be — let me see if I'm reading this right — a permanent condition with no off-switch.

Eliza Ward: That's exactly it — no off-switch. And the thing that makes it structural rather than just bad faith is the Ukrainian Central Election Commission. They've said preparation can only begin after martial law ends. So imagine someone actually sitting at that commission in late 2026, tasked with drafting a preparation timeline. She has nothing to work toward. No trigger. The war doesn't have a finish line anyone can name.

Brian Reed: She's just... waiting for a condition that hasn't been defined.

Eliza Ward: Right. And Zelenskyy on August 23rd said he'll hold elections once security allows. But — wait, that's the whole problem — he has never said what 'security allows' looks like. No benchmark. No threshold. It's a vow with no content.

Brian Reed: So the constitution built a sensible emergency brake — martial law, no elections, fine — but it never built in a release valve. The brake just... stays on indefinitely.

Eliza Ward: And nothing inside the system compels him to name one.

Brian Reed: Which brings me back to the 57% number from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. That poll is real. But — let me see if I'm saying this right — that 57% is forming its opinion inside a wartime information environment where opposition voices can't freely make their case. That's not the same as genuine democratic consent, is it?

Eliza Ward: No. It's not. And I want to be clear — that's inference, not confirmed fact. But the logic holds: if Fedorov's own supporters rejected his election call partly because Putin and Trump are on the same side of the ledger, then the opposition's argument is already pre-discredited before anyone hears it.

Brian Reed: So the watch signal here is simple but specific: does Zelenskyy ever name an actual condition? A ceasefire line, a withdrawal benchmark, anything — or does 'once security allows' stay permanently undefined?

Eliza Ward: That's the one. Martial law continuous since February 2022 — over four years now — and we're still waiting for the first concrete sentence. The moment he names a threshold, the whole frame shifts. Until then, the brake and the cage are the same object.

Brian Reed: And the part that genuinely unsettles me — I mean, it's not a conspiracy question at this point — it's an institutional one. Who inside Ukraine's current framework could actually compel an election once the war ends? Like, is there an actor? A mechanism?

Eliza Ward: That's — yeah, that's the thing I can't find an answer to. The Ukrainian Central Election Commission can't move until martial law lifts. Parliament can't force a presidential vote. And if no one names the condition that ends martial law — which Zelenskyy hasn't — then there's no lever.

Brian Reed: No lever from inside.

Eliza Ward: Right. And May 2024 to August 2026 is already over two years without a mandate — actual elapsed time, not inference. The longer that runs, the more 'no election' stops being a wartime exception and starts being... just how it works. That's not a prediction, that's a structural drift.

Brian Reed: And 'when security allows' stays undefined. That's where it has to eventually come from, and it hasn't.

Zelenskiy says holding elections now would destroy Ukraine—but democratic pressure mounts · Onpode